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Introduction
In this article, I intend to convey a certain point of view about the
"Great Society" (and about public policy and its processes) to those
who know of it only through hearsay and history textbooks. I at-
tempt to fix this point of view by reviewing the planning that went
into two fundamental Great Society programs - the "War on Pov-
erty" and educational planning. To facilitate thinking about the
Great Society's legacy, I conclude with a brief analysis of what has
become of its policy initiatives in poverty and education, and with a
projection about what the history of those initiatives implies for the
future.'
Establishing the beginning and end points of the Great Society is
a difficult task. The popularity of political labels like "the Kennedy-
Johnson era" helps to blur the origin of the Great Society, and in so
doing, also blurs attribution of credit for its successes and blame for
its failures. The terminus of the Great Society is also hazy, in part
because another political label - "the Johnson-Nixon years" -
overwhelmed the national consciousness in the wake of the Viet
Nam War. The end of the Great Society is blurred as well by the
phasing out or incorporation of Great Society programs into other
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1. I use three kinds of evidence in this article: that based on my own observation
and participation, including notes and memoranda dating back to the time when the
events described took place; government numbers - primarily Census Bureau statistics
- which I use as social rather than polimetric indicators; and the voices of important
critics of the Great Society, whose views must be considered, if not for their own merit,
then for the past, present and future integrity of social welfare policy. I make no pre-
tense here of having read the entire canon of works dedicated to chronicling and assess-
ing the Great Society.
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structures, which, while apparently similar, were markedly different
in motive, orientation and organization.
Despite the difficulties inherent in locating the beginning and end
points of the Great Society, it would not be incorrect to mark the
Great Society as a policy event that occurred between 1960 and
1970-1972. Because the Great Society was engendered in the New
Deal tradition of the activist state, the belief in the social goodness
of government was not, as such, a distinctive part of its contribution.
The Great Society's contribution lay in its effort to extend and re-
pair the practice of local government through new institutions such as
Community Action programs and supplementary education cen-
ters. 2 These new structures were designed to bridge the basic gaps
in the national system of government between local neighborhoods
and local government, and between the public and the private sec-
tors. In this respect, the Great Society's approach differed markedly
from that of the New Deal; where the New Deal employed existing
units of local government to carry out its social welfare programs, the
Great Society designed new institutions to encourage the participa-
tion in public affairs of individuals and groups traditionally excluded
from that arena. In attempting to keep government as close to the
human level as possible, the Great Society was more a throwback to
an earlier society in American history than it was the post-war rein-
carnation of the New Deal.
If the structural innovation of the Great Society derived from its
emphasis on an enlightened brand of localism, its ideology involved
a modern interpretation of that age-old tenet that Americans are
capable of anything if only they put their hearts and minds to the
task. Some of the Great Society's assumptions about American soci-
ety are suggested by the very title it assumed - "The Great Soci-
ety" - derived from an essay by Professor F. Graham Wallace.3 As
an integral part of its vision of American society, the Great Society
also made certain critical assumptions about the people it attempted
to help. In the context of a War on Poverty, Great Society planners
assumed that the poor were worth fighting for, that the poor both
could and should participate in the War on Poverty on their own
behalf, and that there was widespread political support for such an
approach to the pervasive social problem of poverty. These particu-
lar assumptions provided the foundation for Community Action.4
2. See infra pp. 28-29 & 40-41.
3. F. WALLACE, THE GREAT SOCIETY (1914).
4. See infra pp. 9-32.
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While economic advancement almost always increases the chances
for genuine social progress, the Great Society did not assume that
economic measures such as jobs programs or direct income assist-
ance programs provided the only means of eliminating poverty.
The vision animating the Great Society held that any successful ef-
fort to root out poverty in America had to reach beyond the
macroeconomic sphere into other arenas of social existence such as
the community. The federal government's role in this vision in-
volved reaching into the communities and neighborhoods, and facil-
itating the creation of new forms of government to attack poverty at
the local levels where it was most pervasive. Existing state and local
structures of government were inadequate for the Great Society's
poverty agenda because they were typically insensitive to the nature
and identities of communities, and because they inhibited participa-
tion in civic affairs. The federal government, it was thought, could
facilitate the establishment of institutions at the community level,
and provide them with enough resources to empower communities
to develop particularized programs for combatting poverty within
their respective jurisdictions. This federal-community partnership
was to be versatile enough to accomplish its goals, whether in East
Los Angeles, in Cheboygan, Michigan, or in the Woodlawn Commu-
nity of Southside Chicago.
If the Great Society saw one way to economic and social advance-
ment, for the poor and nonpoor alike, it was through education.
Not only was increased access to a quality education likely to en-
hance a person's standing in the economic marketplace and in the
social and political affairs of her community; at the time, education
was also considered the key to achieving racial integration in
America. The Great Society envisioned a significant role for the
federal government in enhancing both educational opportunity and
the quality of education at the elementary, secondary and post-sec-
ondary levels. 5 In this objective, the Great Society again posited
goals at once continuous with American political ideology and dis-
junct in their breadth of vision and ambition. Thus it is no coinci-
dence that I have chosen to focus this article on Community Action
and education; together, these two programs comprised the center-
piece of the Great Society's policy thrust for Americans in general,
and for poor Americans in particular.
Visions do not tell the whole tale of the Great Society, however.
While the Great Society was the major policy event of an era, its
5. See infra pp. 35-52.
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contours were disputed vigorously at the time of its conception and
later implementation, 6 and its legacy is currently in disgrace. To
understand this latter phenomenon, the shunning of the Great Soci-
ety, I also examine, albeit in outline form, the two distinct periods of
social welfare policy that have followed the Great Society: the
Nixon-Carter era of the 1970's and the Reagan era of the 1980's.
7
In the Nixon-Carter era, the social welfare policy initiatives of the
Great Society were redirected by the dismantling of those structures
painstakingly developed to implement particular Great Society pro-
grams. Some of the Great Society programs survived the 1970's,
but in a form that rendered impotent much of their original man-
date. In contrast, the Reagan era has to date overseen both the out-
right termination of most Great Society programs and the blatant
rejection of the assumptions and ethos that underlay the Great Soci-
ety. Since we must live in the Reagan era, I offer this narrative ac-
count of the Great Society not so much as a polemic with which to
advocate the reestablishment of programs already terminated, but
as a document, which, in its chronicle, argues that the history of the
Great Society offers a valuable approach to the still pervasive
problems of poverty and inequality in American society.
I. The War on Poverty: Community Action Versus Economic Opportunity
Walter Heller, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visors, once said that John F. Kennedy initiated the "War on Pov-
erty." Whether or not Kennedy actually declared that "war," it was
LyndonJohnson who made it a reality. Johnson, possibly against his
better judgment, eventually took Kennedy's commitment to heart
and translated rhetoric into real policies and programs for the
poor.8
IfJohnson's inspiration derived in part from Kennedy, Kennedy's
own inspiration has been attributed to many sources. Kennedy's al-
legedly emotional awakening to poverty could have been triggered
by any number of events including his 1960 primary campaign in
the back hills of West Virginia, Dwight MacDonald's famous New
Yorker article,9 or perhaps most influential of all, the publication of
6. See infra pp. 17-18.
7. See infra pp. 21-27.
8. Although President Johnson nearly caused the demise of the War on Poverty dur-
ing a critical Christmastime meeting in 1963, infra p. 19, he rightfully claims the War on
Poverty as his own. See L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE PoINT 71-87 (1971).
9. MacDonald, Our Invisible Poor, NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 1963, at 82.
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Michael Harrington's book The Other America.' 0 Combining sociol-
ogy, statistics and socialism in a powerful moral and rhetorical cri-
tique of American society, Harrington's book focused the public eye
on the reality of poverty in America. MacDonald's essay served sim-
ilarly to attune the New Yorker's elite and influential readership to the
plight of the poverty-stricken.
The theory that the Kennedys experienced an abrupt or book-ed-
ucated awakening to the pressing issue of poverty is debatable, how-
ever. The Kennedys must have been well acquainted with areas like
the Roxbury section of Boston, where poverty was every bit as evi-
dent, shaming and compelling as that of Appalachia. It is more
likely that the War on Poverty originated in a decision by important
government actors, both agencies and individuals, that the time was
ripe to make the first efforts on behalf of the poor since the New
Deal era. Even in the absence of public demand, policy-makers rec-
ognized that a solution to the poverty problem was necessary for the
fair administration of government in an era marked by a rising na-
tional consciousness as to the plight of the underclasses in American
society. This view is supported by a statement made by Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan in 1965:
Nor did the War on Poverty come about because of any great surge of
popular demand .... The origins of this effort simply cannot be ex-
plained in deterministic terms. It was more a rational than a political
event. Men at the center of the government perceived the fact.. .that
ugliness, like poverty, is all around them and that the powers of gov-
ernment might eliminate it.II
Whatever the origin of the Government's concern, its ignorance
of the magnitude of the poverty problem was substantial. There-
fore, in spring of 1963, pursuant to a request by President Kennedy,
Walter Heller's staff began to compile the poverty statistics. No sin-
gle, coherent definition of poverty served to organize the poverty
data which the Council of Economic Advisors gathered, however.
Robert Lampman, a Council Staff Member, began the task of collat-
ing the statistics in an attempt to avoid the development of egre-
giously contradictory and counterproductive program proposals.
It is important to recognize the operative assumption of the gov-
ernment actors who were in charge of the gargantuan task of mar-
10. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
11. Moynihan, Three Problems in Combatting Poverty, Poverty in America: Proceedings of a
National Conference Held at the University of California, Berkeley, February 26-28, 1965, (M.




shaling the statistical evidence needed to launch the War on
Poverty. These policy-makers assumed, for planning purposes, that
the poor exhibited the same types of behavior in the same degree as
similarly situated nonpoor people. Thus only "external" variables
such as age and geographical distribution were considered relevant
to gauging the potential impact of a particular program proposal in
a particular area. Common patterns of behavior alleged to be char-
acteristic of the poor as a whole played little or no role in the devel-
opment of programming for the War on Poverty. The fact that the
view of the poor as a fixed or inferior class was neither central nor
victorious in conceptualizing the Great Society is important in com-
paring the policy approaches to poverty of the mid-1960's with
those of the 1980's.
A. Developing a Poverty Program
Responsibility for developing an anti-poverty program was as-
signed to Walter Heller, Chief of the Council of Economic Advisors,
Kermit Gordon, Chief of the Bureau of the Budget, and to an inter-
agency task force ("Task Force"). Although Heller and Gordon
were the designated leaders of the Task Force, the staffs of the De-
partments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare also played
important roles.
The members of the Task Force assembled in the early summer of
1963 and began to canvass for ideas. The War on Poverty was obvi-
ously going to require more than one weapon, and as a result,
nearly every governmental agency became involved in the planning
process. Characteristically, the suggestions and purported "poverty
cures" each agency submitted both furthered and fit basic agency
interests. The Department of Labor, the most ambitious of the line
agencies, submitted 150 proposals: some new, some old and refur-
bished. HEW chose to revive certain proposals conceived decades
ago, revealing both that Department's adherence to a 1930's-style
social security vision of the Great Society and its concomitant com-
mitment to specialized, categorical programs. The Housing and
Health Finance Administration (HHFA became the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in 1965) predictably proposed ur-
ban housing and community development programs.
The self-interested nature of these agency proposals came as no
surprise to the central planners, who had anticipated that any War
on Poverty would have to confront agency orientations and inter-
ests. The planners realized that no across-the-board poverty pro-
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gram could function without the participation of these agencies, at
least in the initial stages of the planning process. The first crop of
proposals confirmed the intuitions both that no agency possessed a
coherent, affordable and politically practicable theory of poverty
from which a comprehensive program could be developed, and that
each agency had its own particular theory of poverty which derived
from its institutional interests.
After reviewing and refining the agency proposals, the Bureau-
Council staff passed the suggestions to the White House for consid-
eration. In the meantime, the Task Force documented the propos-
als in preparation for a meeting to be held in the office of Theodore
Sorenson, the Special Assistant to the President, in October of
1963. The purpose of that meeting was to obtain a first rough cut of
a War on Poverty. Those who convened in Sorenson's office were
confronted, however, with a jumbled mass of multi-colored spread
sheets whose only claim to organization lay in the fact that the vari-
ous program proposals were listed in the stub column with their es-
timated program costs opposite. Only one conclusion was obvious
from the data presented at this meeting: the Task Force staff had not
produced a coherent program that either described, organized or
ranked the various proposals in such a way as to allow policy-makers
to develop an effective plan of action. While the planners were not
unaccustomed to problems of coordination and articulation in the
federal bureaucracy, they were particularly concerned because this
particular failure implicated one of President Kennedy's highest pri-
orities - the War on Poverty. Sorenson told the Task Force to get
back to work.
The list of proposals was shortened and shortened, in the hope
that in less would be found more. The revised list was presented at
a second Sorenson meeting, held just before the assassination on
November 22nd. Those who were present concluded, unfortu-
nately, that editing of the spread sheets was the only thing which
had been achieved in the one-month interim. Time was growing
short and a program for the War on Poverty was no more tangible
than it had been four months earlier.
Planning activity became groping and desultory. New planning
methods and new planners were suggested. Searching intensively
for a solution, bureaucrats from different agencies met to propose
and discuss ideas. One such effort involved the Bureau and Council
staffs in conjunction with HEW. From these discussions emerged
HEW's acceptance of a program based on incentive grants to states
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and localities to encourage the effective coordination of welfare ac-
tivities. The planners concurred with HEW's opinion that most
state and local agencies were working at cross-purposes. Too many
clients were being subjected to too many ministrations from too
many sources, with the result that too many needy recipients were
falling between agency stools.
This realization presented a comparatively great intellectual leap
on the part of policy-makers, but the idea was shelved when they
decided that the only imaginable mechanism of coordination would
be ideologically unacceptable. That is, in order to achieve its goals,
this poverty program would have to provide the equivalent of one
social worker for every poor family to serve as a guide through the
maze of complementary welfare jurisdictions. The paternalism inev-
itably involved in such a scheme was politically unacceptable. This
proposal was also flawed in that it failed to address the other prong
of the poverty problem: how to provide the proper resources in the
proper amounts. The general theory behind this approach, how-
ever, with its emphasis on localism, responded to the fundamental
question of how to provide resources. This ultimately provided the
lynchpin to the theory and practice of Community Action.
After President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963,
LyndonJohnson delivered a special message to Congress which em-
phasized the importance of continuity in government policies be-
tween his administration and that of his predecessor. More
specifically, Johnson's message reflected, at least rhetorically, a con-
tinuing commitment to de' eloping a War on Poverty. It was under-
stood by government insiders, however, that a Christmas meeting
scheduled to convene in Johnson City, Texas, would in fact decide
the extent of the new President's commitment.
By early December, the Task Force had yet to deliver plans for a
workable poverty program into the hands ofJohnson administration
officials. On December 12, however, the Bureau of the Budget in
concert with the Council of Economic Advisors, HEW and the Jus-
tice Department's Juvenile Delinquency staff, issued a proposal in
the form of a memorandum. The Bureau had two reasons for call-
ing upon the Juvenile Delinquency staff for assistance in preparing
the memorandum. First, the staff members, under the leadership of
Robert Kennedy's long-time associate David Hackett, had experi-
ence in the area of local youth programs, an issue to which the Ken-
nedy Administration had accorded high priority. Second, the
Juvenile Delinquency staff, operating out of Robert Kennedy's Jus-
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tice Department, had employed localism as a successful organizing
principle in developing and implementing an anti-delinquency pro-
gram in urban communities. The experience of the Juvenile Delin-
quency staff thus provided a rare and valuable addition to the
Bureau-Council effort, offering support in both theory and practice.
In addition, the fact that the Juvenile Delinquency staff could func-
tion as a direct pipeline to the Attorney General's office proved use-
ful both before and after the assassination. 1
2
The Bureau-Council-Juvenile Delinquency memorandum ("the
Memorandum") outlined, for the first time, the features of a com-
prehensive, community action approach to poverty. It presented
the proposals of the various federal agencies in an organized fashion
and in a way which served to crystallize the diffuse thinking of the
Executive Branch. In sum, the document proposed a coherent and
workable program.
B. The Concept of Community
At the heart of the Memorandum was a proposal for legislation
authorizing state and local governments to establish local "Develop-
ment Corporations." Funds channeled to these corporations would
be used to subsidize local attacks on poverty. These institutions
would be given statutory authority to operate across the whole
range of community poverty issues and to use a variety of different
techniques to achieve their objectives. At bottom, the idea involved
setting up a single local agency empowered to develop and finance
programs proposed by various local agencies. The new bodies,
these development corporations, would be authorized to undertake
almost any type of remedial action with the exception of major
building construction. General supervisory authority would be
vested in the President, who would also have the power to divert
funds from existing programs to local development corporations
and to waive existing restrictions on the use of these funds.' 3
12. See infra pp. 25-26.
13. This waiver power ultimately evolved into the Preference Clause of the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 529, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2942(h), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519, 42 U.S.C. § 9912(a) (1982). The Preference Clause, a much
watered-down version of the President's power as proposed in the Memorandum, re-
quired existing federal agencies to allocate their own funds in such a way as to "prefer"
poverty programs. The political necessity of this delegation of the ultimate locus of
discretion from the President back to the agencies was revealed at the time in Labor
Secretary Willard Wirtz's observation that were the President to have unbridled author-
ity to dispense the funds of the Department of Labor, the Secretary might not have
much left to do.
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In order to build a poverty program around localities, any plan
predicated on community action had to ensure that as much of the
local community as possible was committed to combatting poverty.
The Memorandum indicated that the new approach to poverty de-
manded consultation with and participation of the poor in the plan-
ning process. Participation, however, was not intended to be
limited to the poor; nor was the local program to represent only the
ideas of the professional community. The program called for the
participation of the poor, along with others, in recognition of the fact
that communities run by the poor alone would not be genuinely
democratic. In this way community action would do what states and
municipalities had failed to do, namely to provide adequate incen-
tives and assistance to the poor by bringing the poor and the rest of
the community together in a shared effort to defeat poverty at the
local level.'
4
The basic theme of the Memorandum was that many approaches
were possible in dealing with the problem of poverty. Because no
single, determinative description of either the origin or the magni-
tude of poverty in America was available, neither were there any ob-
vious responses to the problem. In the absence of concrete
solutions at this stage in the planning process, the Memorandum
recommended that the Government concentrate on developing a
method of combatting poverty. This procedural approach did not, of
course, preclude targeting for immediate attention those substan-
tive areas such as housing and education that possessed an identifi-
able and relatively noncontroversial relationship to the presence of
poverty in American society. Yet by elevating procedure over sub-
stance, at least initially, the Memorandum's authors were able to
break the policy stalemate and at the same time to preserve enough
flexibility to accommodate both old and new programs in develop-
ing a War on Poverty.
C. The Appeal of Localism
The specific programming recommended by the Memorandum
was consistent with the general mood to "go local," a mood that had
14. It is difficult to see what this theory of community action misunderstood. The
only major question at the time was whether communities in fact existed as we had con-
ceived them, and, if they did not, whether they could be created. Despite the claim of
detractors, see D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY AC-
TION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 10-11 (1969), the idea of community was a concrete con-
cept which was defined in each case by discrete geographic, demographic and cultural
parameters.
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considerable practical advantage as well as rhetorical appeal. By
providing grants to localities, 15 it was possible to bypass certain
state and municipal structures, particularly those in the South, and
thus to prevent them from interposing themselves between the fed-
eral government and the poor. In this way localities would be left
free to launch a comprehensive and coordinated attack on poverty
- an attack involving various health, education, labor and other
weapons - in a defined geographical area. Such a plan also ap-
pealed to the Government's desire to foster a sense of community
responsibility in implementing a War on Poverty.
The existing federal agencies were receptive to the Memorandum
for a number of reasons. They had learned, some through experi-
ence, that despite the need for certain established public assistance
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, these
programs could be faulted for treating the poor as mere objects at
the end of a delivery system. The agencies were therefore receptive
to the Memorandum's insight that a new approach to poverty de-
manded consultation with and participation of the poor. By viewing
the poor simply as recipients of aid programs, the agencies had been
unable to bridge the gap between what the recipient truly needed
and what was actually supplied.
The agencies were therefore eager, at least in theory, to solicit the
advice of the poor in the program-planning process and thereby to
benefit from whatever insights the poor were able to supply. It was
also thought that such an approach might provide incentives for
those consulted to find a way out of poverty through participation
and education. The agencies were also attracted, or at least neutral-
ized, by the political appeal of localism, an idea which has long held
an august place in the American political tradition. If there was a
motivating force behind agency acceptance of the Memorandum's
approach, it was predicated on the tradition of localism and not on
any particular attachment to an abstract quest for community. Ac-
ceptance of a plan for a War on Poverty based on local community
action sat well with key departments such as HUD, HEW and Agri-
culture, which in the past had made extensive use of both state and
local institutions for administrative purposes.
Finally, the Memorandum found favor in some quarters because it
articulated a desire to lighten the paternalistic hand that govern-
15. While at this stage of development the term "locality" referred primarily to local
governments, the definition was later expanded to include sub-local communities such
as Harlem and neighborhoods as well.
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ment laid upon the poor. Many thought that the paternalism and
stigma associated with government relief might be reduced by in-
volving the poor in planning local approaches to poverty and by
treating them as equals in the process.
D. Community Action as an Innovative Concept
The outline of a War on Poverty based on the idea of community
action ("Community Action") was heralded by some as portending
a major new form of political and social organization. No one in-
volved in those early planning sessions, however, suggested that the
purpose of Community Action was to create or promote a radical
new political structure. On the contrary, Community Action was
viewed by its creators as either a supplement or an alternative to
traditional governmental programs, depending on the nature of the
existing structure of government in a particular area.
In Chicago, for instance, the supplemental aspects of the program
would be emphasized. In responding to the federal initiative, Mayor
Daley explicitly stated his intent to incorporate the Community Ac-
tion Program into his city's structure. Daley also made it clear, how-
ever, that while he welcomed the plan and the resources it would
bring to Chicago, and while he would defer to the principle of local
participation, he would not allow the federal program to compete
with local government. That position determined the history of
Community Action in Chicago.
In criticizing Community Action in 1969, Daniel Patrick Moynihan
emphasized the alternative structure option to the virtual exclusion
of the supplementary option 16 and thus misrepresented the range of
possibilities Community Action afforded. What Mr. Moynihan and
his colleagues failed to see was that Community Action was a demo-
cratic and protean concept flexible enough to accommodate all vari-
eties of local governmental structures. These critics interpreted
Community Action as advocating, without qualification, a federally
run alternative to local government, instead of as providing, in some
instances, a mere supplement to entrenched local programs. Hav-
ing seized upon this doomsday scenario, critics failed to recognize
the more conservative supplementary function that Community Ac-
tion allowed. Misunderstanding both the concept of Community
Action and the variety of possible ways of implementing the pro-
gram, they characterized it as a radical move that would promote
hostility towards established political institutions.
16. See D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14.
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E. Moving Towards Implementation
Considerations of political theory aside, the Community Action
proposal was intended to meet immediately pressing practical con-
cerns, namely the Administration's need for a coherent and work-
able approach to the War on Poverty. The December 12th
Memorandum made the rounds of the federal bureaucracy. The
Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors pro-
moted the Memorandum as the central feature of the poverty pro-
gram. Heller included a revised version of the Council's work in a
memorandum addressed to Sorenson. Entitled "A Coordinated
Community Action Program," this memo recommended that Com-
munity Action become the key component of the Administration's
attack on poverty. In response, Sorenson invited representatives
from the Bureau, the Council and various Departments (Labor,
Commerce and HEW) to discuss the proposal. Although Labor de-
cried the program as a band-aid solution because it did not advocate
the costly jobs program Labor had vigorously promoted as the cen-
terpiece of any War on Poverty, HUD and HEW supported it.
Those present at the meeting at least agreed that they had a coher-
ent proposal before them for the first time. The Memorandum's
supporters eventually won the day. An inter-agency group of policy
people, in conjunction with lawyers from HEW, HHFA and Agricul-
ture, set about drafting a Community Action bill.
The specifications for the bill were drawn up quickly. Because
each department was consulted during the drafting process, each
feature of the program, including Community Action, was thor-
oughly scrutinized through the lens of agency self-interest. While
the agencies did not suggest any major changes, they did voice spe-
cific objections. These objections stemmed from a variety of consid-
erations including concern that communities did not possess
adequate leadership resources to develop and execute a Community
Action plan, that local leadership would prevent the development
and execution of such a plan, or more cynically, that the delays
which would inevitably accompany the establishment of a compre-
hensive and coordinated local plan would defer politically crucial
results until after the 1964 elections. December and January found
Community Action the subject of exhaustive inquiry and debate.
One such discussion overshadowed all others, however. Walter
Heller and Kermit Gordon were scheduled to travel to Johnson
City, Texas, during the Christmas holidays to inform, instruct and
ultimately persuade President Johnson to lend total support to a
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War on Poverty in general, and to Community Action in particular.
The mission was not going to be easy. Rumors abounded that the
President was doubting the efficacy of the War on Poverty and Com-
munity Action. He was said to be concerned both about the relative
haste with which the program had been developed and about its re-
ception by Congress and the public. More specifically, while Presi-
dent Johnson concurred with the Department of Labor over the
importance of a jobs program, he feared that launching an employ-
ment program of sufficient magnitude to combat poverty would
wreak havoc with the budget.
During the Christmas meetings with Heller and Gordon, Presi-
dent Johnson apparently vacillated between rejecting and accepting
the Community Action Program. I have been told that one night he
overruled Heller and Gordon and voiced his intent to scratch the
program; the next morning, however, he heeded their plea to recon-
sider. In the end, President Johnson decided that there would be a
poverty program, and that Community Action would be its center-
piece. The fact that President Johnson regarded Community Action
as an extension of the American political tradition of localism,
rather than as vehicle for proletarian revolution, was in part respon-
sible for his ultimate acceptance of the concept.
17
The Johnson City Christmas episode accelerated the drafting pro-
cess, and the momentum built to submit a bill to the Congress. Now
that there was greater certainty among policy-makers about the pos-
sibility of translating policies into programs, the War on Poverty and
Community Action became the object of intensive review in the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Because the Government had to reorganize existing housing, wel-
fare, health, education, and labor programs in order to wage an ef-
fective War on Poverty, the structure of the undertaking merited
particular attention. Since it was administratively and politically im-
possible to create a new Department of Poverty to encompass all the
federal programs then bearing on poverty, a different mechanism
for coordination was needed. Community Action and the principle
of localism provided the solution, at least in theory, to the coordina-
tion problem by implying that the federal programs be coordinated
from the bottom up, with local institutions serving as filters for the
federal programs. The first step in the effort to solve the coordina-
tion problem would thus involve creating local agencies to coordi-
17. See L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE PoINT 74-75 (1971).
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nate the various federal programs dealing with health, jobs, housing
and the like, at the local level.
Furthermore, since the War on Poverty would operate largely
outside the sphere of the traditional agencies, it was going to re-
quire firm, centralized direction. How that control was to be struc-
tured was the subject of some debate within the Executive Branch.
There were two feasible approaches: either vest control with ex-
isting organizations supplemented by conventional coordinating
mechanisms, or create a new agency with a new form of inter-agency
directorate. The first option was supported by Labor and HEW; the
latter by HHFA (HUD), Agriculture and Commerce. The issue was
resolved by the end of January when the Bureau, the Council and
the line agencies met in Sorenson's office and decided to create a
new agency. This option was favored at least in part because it
would preserve the institutional interests of existing federal
agencies.
Once this decision was made, the planners began drafting a bill
which located the War on Poverty and the Community Action Pro-
gram in a new, independent agency that would coordinate the pov-
erty programs of other agencies.' 8 In order to finance the program
through the annual budget process, $700-800 million was to be
commandeered from existing budgets and pending programs. In
addition, the President intended to request from the Congress ap-
proximately $500 million in new appropriations for the Community
Action Program. Five hundred million dollars was considered-a fea-
sible figure, both fiscally and politically, on which to base a request
for appropriations, especially given the program value these monies
would buy. 19
At the President's request, John Kenneth Galbraith had previ-
ously written an eloquent draft message to Congress advocating
support for the War on Poverty and Community Action. Galbraith's
draft was too general, however; it did not adequately reflect the par-
ticular program proposal that would be sent to the Hill. On January
28, 1964, the Bureau and Council staffs translated Galbraith's draft
into a more specific Presidential message. The Bureau-Council
18. This new federal agency vested with special coordinating functions would even-
tually become the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). See infra pp. 28-29.
19. The $500 million figure was considered by some agencies, particularly the De-
partment of Labor, as insufficient to finance a full-scale War on Poverty. See supra p. 18.
This objection was based, however, on a theory which the President ultimately rejected,




draft set forth a general theory of Community Action for Congres-
sional consideration which asserted the following:
1) Because existing categorical programs isolated elements in
the complex structure of poverty, little progress was being made in
the effort to dismantle the structure itself. The categorical pro-
grams currently operating out of a score of different federal agen-
cies were not useless; they did, however, need to be coordinated and
focused before a comprehensive attack on poverty could be
implemented.
2) In addition, new programs were needed to address the pov-
erty problem. While these new programs would differ markedly
from their categorical predecessors, it was still necessary to target
for attention broad program areas such as housing and education.
This would give substantive content to the War on Poverty without
tying the government to ultra-specific program commitments at this
early stage.
3) A successful War on Poverty could only begin at the commu-
nity level. Because poverty fundamentally affects the fabric of com-
munity life, any forceful effort to eradicate poverty would
necessarily have an impact on the community. Because a commu-
nity's relative autonomy is thereby implicated, the community
should have a strong voice in developing and implementing pro-
grams intended to eliminate poverty at the local level. Therefore,
the federal government's role should be limited to that of an ener-
getic, facilitating and friendly overseer who would provide ongoing
support for the community's efforts to combat poverty.
4) Poverty was a community phenomenon, not a macro-
economic phenomenon. Hence poverty would not respond well to
general fiscal measures initiated at the national level.
This draft message was sent to the White House for review. The
message and the draft bill were scheduled to go to the Hill during
the first or second week of February.
F. New Leadership for the War on Poverty
On Saturday, February 1, 1964, the President surprised the plan-
ning staffs of the Bureau and the Council by placing R. Sargent
Shriver, his Special Assistant, in charge of programming for the War
on Poverty. 20 While Shriver's job was going to be difficult - he had
20. Shriver would eventually become the Director of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, the central coordinating agency of the War on Poverty. See infra pp. 28-29.
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to first inform and then convince Congress - at the time no one
knew which direction he intended to steer the War on Poverty.
In order to ascertain Shriver's position, Kermit Gordon arranged
a meeting with him the next day and invited many of the key plan-
ners, including myself.2' Gordon began the meeting by extolling
the virtues of the Community Action concept as both a feasible and
laudable way of approaching the poverty problem. In promoting
Community Action, Gordon clearly refused to define Community
Action as a mere tool of federal management, and emphasized in-
stead the appropriateness of local initiative in attempting to solve
what was at bottom as much a cultural as an economic problem.
During the course of the meeting, however, it became evident that
Shriver was skeptical of Community Action in large part because he
questioned its amenability to the three objectives he had already
identified as critical to the success of a revised War on Poverty: pub-
lic visibility, effectiveness and speed. 22 More specifically, Shriver ar-
gued that the Community Action Program promised sufficient
power to achieve his stated ends only if the Budget Bureau would
enforce what Gordon could not promise: a requirement that line
agencies spend and administer their programs at Shriver's
direction. 2
3
As we had conceived it, however, Community Action was not to
be either located in or constituted solely from existing federal agen-
cies. Rather, Community Action was intended to provide a separate
funding mechanism which directed federal funding to localities for
the purpose of combatting poverty from the bottom up. Shriver's
demand at once demonstrated his unwillingness to assimilate the
program outlines we had sketched and his naivete with regard to
agency politics.
It was difficult not to despair. After months of effort which, in our
21. Besides Gordon, Shriver and myself, Heller, Charles Schultz (Assistant Director,
Budget Bureau), William Capron (Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisors),
Gardner Ackley (Member, Council of Economic Advisors), and Meyer Feldman (Coun-
sel to the President) attended this February 2nd meeting. With Shriver were Adam
Yarmolinsky (Department of Defense), Frank Mankiewicz (Public Information Officer,
Peace Corps), Warren Wiggins (Assistant Director, Peace Corps), and William Joseph-
son (Attorney, Office of Counsel, Peace Corps).
22. In Shriver's eyes, the three elements of visibility, effectiveness and speed were as
necessary for a successful War on Poverty as for a successful Peace Corps, of which he
was Director from 1961-1966. I wondered at the time whether or not these two pro-
grams were appropriate for comparison, given the radically different contexts in which
each was required to operate.
23. I locate the politically problematic nature of this demand more precisely else-
where. See supra note 13.
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collective estimation, had resulted in a coherent and workable pro-
gram, the Administration thrust a significant obstacle in the path of
the War on Poverty by placing Shriver in command. Because he had
not participated in the planning sessions, we feared that Shriver
would feel less bound by our conclusions as to the appropriateness
and feasibility of localism as the organizing principle of a successful
War on Poverty, especially given his apparent hostility to the idea of
Community Action. This development could not have happened at
a worse juncture: now was the time to sell the poverty program to
Congress.
During the course of this first fateful meeting, we attempted to
convince Shriver of the utility of a War on Poverty predicated upon
Community Action as we had conceived it by making promises
which stretched the limits of our credibility. We claimed, for in-
stance, that programs could begin immediately in twenty-five urban
centers. Shriver was skeptical. He was convinced that governors,
mayors and other state and local officials would obstruct any effort
to wage a War on Poverty from the local barricades. 24 The answer
to anticipated local resistance was instead, according to Shriver, a
direct national program.
We could not completely deny Shriver's skepticism. Because
Community Action had been conceived as a method of combatting
poverty rather than as a substantive solution in and of itself, it was
difficult to predict the immediate or even long-term effects of such
an approach in any given community. In addition, the spectre of
local resistance to the civil rights movement loomed large in the
background as a visible standard against which to measure poverty
initiatives coordinated through and focused on localities. 25
Shriver's claim, however, that Community Action was an inherently
conservative concept which would operate to protect unenlightened
aggregations of local power was as one-sided as Moynihan's posi-
tion in Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding that interpreted Commu-
24. A later conversation with then New Haven Mayor Richard Lee (1954-1969) con-
firmed that Shriver did not believe our claims of limited local readiness.
25. In retrospect, perhaps the major threat to Community Action in both the Execu-
tive Branch and the Congress was the fact that some viewed it as a program which could
potentially play into the hands of those opposed to the Civil Rights Movement by con-
centrating even more power in the hands of local racists. Much of the language of Title
II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 516-524,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2837, repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, Title VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519, 42 U.S.C. § 9912 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as EOA, Title II], the statutory incarnation of Community Action, was manipulated
to avoid this threat.
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nity Action as inherently destructive of cherished local autonomy. 26
To our mind Community Action would not lead inevitably to either
of these results; and with careful legislative drafting, we would en-
sure that it did not.
To counter Shriver's insistence on a direct federal program, we
relied on the Administration's position. The White House staff had
acknowledged that local responsibility and local action would better
the chances of the program's acceptance by Congress. In addition,
Shriver had been cautioned against seeking authorization for an au-
tonomous federal program that would operate within localities. We
interpreted the position of the White House staff as directing
Shriver to begin developing a set of local relationships which, even
if they would not achieve the Administration's objectives as effi-
ciently as would a direct federal program, would both provide fed-
eral control without the impression of dominance and enlist and
attract local resources and experience. Stressing that such criteria
were politically indispensable to a successful War on Poverty, we
argued that Community Action was a thoughtfully designed policy
which had the approval of the Executive Branch.
Despite our best efforts at persuasion, however, Shriver remained
unconvinced. We left the meeting disheartened: it appeared that
Community Action did not accord with Shriver's objectives. Shriver
now faced the task of piecing together his own program from the
shards of our work and whatever raw material he could find else-
where in the policy-making community.
G. The Shriver Task Force Makes Revisions
Immediately after meeting with us, Shriver assembled a working
group composed of reporters, business leaders, labor leaders,
professors and mayors, to begin the search for a new approach to
the War on Poverty.2 7 From the outset, the Shriver Task Force re-
jected Community Action as the organizing principle for their War
on Poverty; it was criticized as too elusive a concept for an "action-
oriented" group. The local thrust of Community Action even made
26. D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 183.
27. The key participants in the Shriver Task Force were Adam Yarmolinsky, Defense
Department; Frank Mankiewicz, general aide to Shriver and Yarmolinsky; Daniel Patrick
Moynihan and Eric Tolmach, Department of Labor; James Sundquist, Department of
Agriculture; Paul Ylvisaker, Ford Foundation; Paul Jacobs, Center for the Study of Dem-
ocratic Ideas; Michael Harrington, author; Wilbur Cohen and Harold Horowitz, Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare; Andrew Brimmer, James Adler and Gerald




enemies of its natural friends, Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs,
who believed that only massive direct federal efforts would have any
effect on the poverty problem. Of all the members of the Shriver
Task Force, only Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation supported
the Community Action Program.
2 8
By mid-February, 1964, the Shriver Task Force had surveyed the
landscape (as well as could be expected in two weeks), and had con-
sidered and discarded hundreds of ideas. The Task Force was both
inclined and under pressure to settle on a few specific and innova-
tive proposals. Yarmolinsky instructed me to review existing federal
programs which might be commandeered for the War on Poverty,
and to estimate the cost of an over-inclusive list of proposed pro-
grams, including, after pleas by Ylvisaker, Horowitz and me, a pro-
posal for a limited Community Action Program. Yarmolinsky and
Moynihan actively campaigned for a jobs program which Moynihan
saw as the means for reconstructing the Negro family;29 Harrington
and Jacobs proposed programs possible only under a different gov-
ernment in a different society.
The Shriver Task Force remained hostile to the concept of Com-
munity Action.30 In order to soften the resistance, I turned for help
to David Hackett, head of the Justice Department's Juvenile Delin-
quency Program and close friend and assistant to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy.3 t To this day I consider the fact that Hackett pre-
vailed upon Attorney General Kennedy to intercede with Shriver on
behalf of Community Action 32 to be the proximate cause of the sur-
vival and ultimate inclusion of Community Action in the Economic
28. Ylvisaker's support rested on what he perceived to be the similarity between the
idea of Community Action and the Ford Foundation's Gray Zones Program. "Gray ar-
eas" or "gray zones" referred to blighted, inner-city locales to which the Ford Founda-
tion, beginning in the late 1950's, committed substantial funds for research and study in
an effort to discover ways of preventing deterioration in these communities. As part of
the Gray Zones Program, the Ford Foundation also contributed funds that were directed
towards enhancing existing social service support networks.
29. For a detailed description of Moynihan's position on the black family in America,
see generally OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
30. At one point during this second wave of policy-making, there was a heated dis-
cussion among the members of the Shriver Task Force concerning the threat that Com-
munity Action might pose to local authorities. Ylvisaker graphically outlined this threat
by positing the potentially adverse impact of Community Action Programs on mayors.
31. See supra p. 13.
32. As I noted above in the context of the justice Department's Juvenile Delinquency
Program, see supra p. 14, Robert Kennedy was amenable to local approaches to systemic
and contextual problems. Kennedy himself later employed a Community Action ethos
in developing the Bedford-Stuyvesant Project in New York City, where he sought to
extend and concretize the idea of localism. See A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND
His TIMES 786-89 (1978).
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Opportunity Act of 1964.3 3
It is perhaps instructive to pause here and consider various expla-
nations which have been proposed for the ultimate amenability of
the federal government and particularly the Executive Branch to the
concept of Community Action. Some commentators have cited the
influence of professional social reformers as crucial to the concep-
tion and acceptance of Community Action.3 4 The history of the ori-
gins of Community Action as I witnessed it and have attempted to
describe herein, however, indicates that the connection between
these reformers and the actual program was obscure at best. The
contribution of Hackett's Juvenile Delinquency staff,3 5 though im-
portant, was not determinative; the concept of Community Action
eventually expanded far beyond the insights afforded by the Juve-
nile Delinquency experience to encompass elements necessary for
government-wide acceptance and nationwide application.
Nor was Community Action a mere reflection of or appendage to
the Civil Rights Movement, the fate of which was by no means cer-
tain by the time the Community Action Program was enacted. In-
deed, the Civil Rights Movement probably impeded acceptance of
Community Action within key segments of the Executive Branch
precisely because of the program's localist orientation.36
There is a school of thought with which I would also like to take
issue which alleges that a certain historical determinism drove Com-
munity Action forward to its predictable pinnacle as one of the cen-
terpieces of the Economic Opportunity Act.3 7 For a variety of
reasons, it is difficult to conclude that Community Action was in any
way inevitable. First, from a politically pragmatic perspective, if
Community Action had surfaced as an organizing principle for the
War on Poverty before Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson
might have been more reluctant to make it a focus of his anti-pov-
erty program. Second, Shriver's appointment to the helm of the
poverty program was a not insignificant obstacle to the acceptance
of Community Action.38 Third, it was sheer luck that ultimate re-
sponsibility for drafting the anti-poverty legislation was vested in
the Justice Department and not in HEW; Community Action had a
33. EOA, Title II.
34. See generally D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14.
35. See supra p. 14.
36. See supra note 25.
37. I consider Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Robert Nisbet as leaders of this particu-
lar school of thought.
38. See supra pp. 21-25.
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friend in Robert Kennedy. In the final analysis, I believe that Com-
munity Action's inclusion in the final outline of the Johnson Admin-
istration's War on Poverty was due in part to luck, and in part to its
resonance with the American political mythos of local autonomy.
H. The War on Poverty Takes Legislative Form
Even though it had been decided that Community Action was to
be included in the poverty bill, there remained the task of drafting
the legislation. Yarmolinsky, Shriver's deputy, originally assigned
the drafting job to HEW, but later transferred the task to the Justice
Department on the theory that a department comprised of lawyers
would draft a better bill.
Assistant Attorney General Norbert Schlie led the group drafting
the bill. We began drafting the legislation on a weekend in the sec-
ond half of February, building on both agency and non-agency doc-
uments. The bill we produced over that long weekend was never
significantly changed by either the Executive Branch or Congress.
Particularly immune to alteration was Title II of the Economic Op-
portunity Act of 1964, 39 which provided for Community Action.
During the drafting process, we resolved some problems that had
plagued us throughout the planning stages, while making funda-
mental decisions about the substantive outline of a War on Poverty.
In sifting through the proposed programs to identify those we
thought most appropriate for legislative consideration, we had to be
selective. For instance, while the Jobs Corps and the Neighborhood
Youth Corps were included, the Mississippi "latifundia" program
was not.4
0
Both the Jobs Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps Pro-
grams had their roots in the youth and works programs of the New
Deal: the National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conserva-
tion Corps. For some time, Senator, and later Vice President, Hu-
bert Humphrey had been calling for the resuscitation of such
programs. Humphrey was now vigorously supported on this issue
by Sargent Shriver and Labor Secretary Wirtz, who thought that
programs modeled on the New Deal example were a politically at-
tractive means of dealing with two critical factors in the poverty
equation, namely youth and employment. Not only were these New
39. EOA, Title II.
40. Proposed by the Department of Agriculture, the Mississippi "latifundia" pro-
gram was intended to provide assistance to the abject poor of the Mississippi delta re-
gion through the repurchasing and redistribution of land.
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Deal programs resurrected in the poverty bill, they were also em-
phasized in the text by making the Jobs Corps, with its objective of
facilitating non-urban employment for ghetto youth, the first title of
the proposed Economic Opportunity Act.
41
In drafting that section of the bill, Title II, pertaining to Commu-
nity Action, we searched for statutory language that would make
concrete our intent to encourage participation of the poor in forg-
ing local solutions to the poverty problem. HEW's Harold
Horowitz provided the words which eventually appeared in the stat-
ute: Community Action was to be run with the "maximum feasible
participation of the residents of the areas." 42 These words best con-
veyed our firm conviction that the poor were as able as anyone else
to plan and implement programs which affected them most directly,
that their participation would make the programs more effective,
and that only through this participation could the paternalism char-
acteristic of earlier poverty programs be eliminated.
After the bill was drafted, it was distributed to the various federal
agencies for their consideration. At a large meeting held at the end
of February and run by Shriver, the bill was discussed and approved
by agency representatives.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 196443 sailed through the Con-
gress on August 20th. Meanwhile, Shriver was hard at work assem-
bling a new implementing agency, the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO), which would fill in the details of the War on
Poverty. Basic programs built on the conceptual foundation of
Community Action, such as the Neighborhood Health Centers Pro-
gram, the Legal Services Program, Headstart and Upward Bound,
were already in the implementation stage. By the time the bill had
passed, the agency was ready to move.
The OEO soon established working relationships around the
country with local institutions, both governmental and non-govern-
mental, which were to assume development and implementation
functions. As we had both anticipated and encouraged, the structure
of local participation varied according to the needs and resources of
different communities. Some cities and towns were neither eager
41. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, Title I, 78 Stat. 508,
508-524, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2711-2781, repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519, 42 U.S.C. § 9912 (1982).
42. EOA, Title II.
43. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2701, repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title
VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519, 42 U.S.C. § 9912 (1982).
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nor able to run their own Community Action Program. These local-
ities that opted for federal direction as well as sponsorship of Com-
munity Action typically possessed only a part-time legislative body
and a city manager who was already responsible for a downtown
renewal project. Community Action enabled such towns and cities
to establish non-profit, non-governmental agencies to administer
the poverty programs in their jurisdictions. Because Community
Action provided an flexible approach for combatting poverty, it was
able to do what had never been done before: facilitate an assault on
poverty at every local level, including the neighborhood level, regard-
less of the locality's particular resource structure.
44
J. Community Action Under Fire
These and more independent community liaisons developed
throughout the fall and winter of 1964 and into 1965; eventually
more than 900 Community Action agencies were established at the
local level. Before these agencies could begin their initial organiz-
ing activities, however, powerful figures within the Administration
launched a major attack on Community Action in an attempt to viti-
ate its influence in the War on Poverty. The source of much of the
criticism was the Department of Labor, which, despite the promi-
nence of the Jobs Corps in the Economic Opportunity Act, re-
mained threatened by the potential power of the Community Action
concept.
First, some argued that the Community Action Program would
function to spread "New York City's brand of ethnic socialism"
throughout the country. 45 Second, and more compelling in the view
of the White House, was the claim that Community Action would
result in the creation of a political party that would compete with the
Democratic Party for constituents. The implicit conclusion was that
the Johnson Administration was financing the destruction of the
Democratic Party by promoting the Economic Opportunity legisla-
tion. These arguments may have had an effect on President Johnson
himself, who was quoted as saying that we had made a "boo-boo" by
including Community Action in the War on Poverty legislation.46
As the War on Poverty, and necessarily Community Action, got
44. For a more pessimistic view of the possibilities of Community Action, see gener-
ally D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14.
45. Daniel Patrick Moynihan characterized Community Action this way in a conver-
sation with me in late 1964.
46. Charles Schultz, then Director of the Budget Bureau, reported this as the Presi-
dent's comment.
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under way, the opposition branched out. Certain academic policy-
makers mounted a continual attack on Community Action by means
of university seminars held in Boston and Washington, designed to
"monitor" and "evaluate" the Community Action Programs.
Whenever Congressional hearings were held on OEO authorizing
legislation, these critics presented their seminar reports as "impar-
tial data" to assist legislative evaluation of Community Action's
track record.47 Attacks on Community Action were also mounted
from other quarters. Some big-city mayors launched one line of at-
tack by charging Community Action with the political crime of or-
ganizing an internal civic enemy. Other opponents argued that
Community Action was the source of the mid-sixties riots. Commu-
nity Action was even labelled by some as the self-interested inven-
tion of academic reformers who sought to line their own pockets at
the expense of the poor.
Community Action was attacked at the level of theory as well.
Some critics charged that Community Action was theoretically defi-
cient because it was grounded on what they said were empirically
uninformed propositions that the poor were capable of participating
in government, and that their participation would benefit society.
48
These relentless attacks on both the program and the poor were
made not only in the Executive Branch and the policy-making com-
munity, but in the Congress as well. Legislative opposition trans-
lated into budget restraints in the form of multiplied restrictions on
funds allocated to and categorized for the Community Action
Program.49
The criticism, growing in strength and effect, continued to the
end of the Johnson Administration and provided adequate support
for Richard Nixon's strong stance against both the War on Poverty
and Community Action. By the time Nixon assumed office in 1969
47. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and his students at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology orchestrated this particular critical effort.
48. Moynihan was again a visible spokesperson for this kind of criticism:
It may be that the poor are never "ready" to assume power in an advanced society:
the exercise of power in an effective manner is an ability acquired through appren-
ticeship and seasoning. Thrust on an individual or group, the results are often pain-
ful to observe .... [T]he power of the weak [is] the power to disrupt, to embarrass,
to provoke, to goad to punitive rage ....
D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 136-37.
49. Representative Edith Green (D-Oregon) and Representative Albert Quie (R-
Minnesota) led the congressional opposition. An example of the kind of crippling re-
strictions the Green-Quie faction managed to impose on Community Action was the




and appointed a staff that included advisors from the anti-Commu-
nity Action faction within the Johnson Administration, Community
Action was, for all intents and purposes, a dead letter. The formal
demise of Community Action was delayed by its conversion in 1976
into a mere service delivery mechanism under the aegis of the Com-
munity Services Administration; Community Action received a
nearly fatal blow in 1981 when the Community Services Administra-
tion itself was terminated.50
K. Some Reflections on Community Action
If the rhetorical theme of the Great Society was economic oppor-
tunity, as the title of the War on Poverty legislation suggests, its
more profound theme rested on faith in a utopian yet realizable
form of localism represented by Community Action. To be sure,
certain programs established by the Economic Opportunity Act
such as the Jobs Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, basic edu-
cation for adults and work experience programs, were explicitly in-
tended to promote economic opportunity for members of low-
income groups. The same was true of the efforts to enhance certain
sectors of the established social welfare program structure including
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Social Security.
As I have tried to show in this section of the article, however,
Community Action was different in kind from these War on Poverty
programs devoted to the American ethos of economic opportunity.
Community Action sought to go beyond simple economic assistance
in both principle and operation to achieve a new organization of
political life in this country. The Community Action Program was
much less important as an instrument of direct economic empower-
ment than as a new approach to the organization of federal and state
activities in the field of social welfare programming. With its empha-
sis on "cooperation from the bottom up" and "maximum feasible
participation" of local residents in combatting the poverty problem,
Community Action brought an old idea about government into the
50. Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which administered
Community Action, Pub. L. No. 88-452, Title II, 78 Stat. 508, 516-524. The Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) became the Community Services Administration under
President Ford. See Community Services Act Technical Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-341, § 2, 90 Stat. 803, 803-807, 42 U.S.C. § 270 (1976). The Economic Oppor-
tunity Act and the Community Services Act were repealed in 1981 by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519, 42
U.S.C. § 9912 (1982). In fiscal year 1982, parts of the Community Services Act of 1976
were consolidated into the Office of Community Services and administered by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services. See Community Services Block Grant Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-558, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9901, 9901-9901a (1982).
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modern era of the bureaucratic state. Politics, writ both large and
small, prevented Community Action from fully realizing its potential
as a new approach to government; in so doing, it also, and perhaps
more tragically, prevented the political empowerment of the poor in
American society.
II. Innovation in Educational Policy: Equality of Opportunity and
Educational Quality
Just as the concept of Community Action marked a distinct break
with previous federal efforts directed at poverty, so too the educa-
tional programming of the Great Society was disjunctive in both de-
gree and kind with what had gone before. In order to place the
Great Society's achievements on the educational front in perspec-
tive, it is instructive to review briefly the role played by the federal
government in educating its citizenry in the decades that preceded
the Johnson initiative.
A. The Federal Government's Role in Education Before the Great Society
With the exception of the World War II and Korean Conflict GI
Bills, 5' federal involvement in education was relatively limited prior
to the years of the Great Society. 52 During that period, the only
federal educational programs were the Land Grant Colleges pro-
gram of the Lincoln Administration, 53 the small vocational educa-
tion and training program which developed in the wake of World
War I, 5 4 the agricultural research and education programs, 55 and
51. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284; Veter-
ans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663.
52. Because my perspective derives from having participated in and observed execu-
tive decision-making during the Johnson Administration, my account of federal involve-
ment in education is necessarily skewed towards the Executive Branch. I do not mean to
deemphasize judicial efforts on this front, especially Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) and its progeny, that materialized in the aftermath of World War II.
These significant judicial contributions to enhanced educational opportunity are forever
in the background of (and in some sense provide the backbone for) my account.
53. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 301-349 (1982)).
54. See Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-347, 39
Stat. 436 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 11-15, 16, 28 (1982)).
55. See Bankhead-Jones Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-182, 49 Stat. 436 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 427-427i (1982)); Purnell Act of 1925, ch. 308, Pub. L. No. 68-
457, 43 Stat. 970, repealed by Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 790, § 2, 69 Stat. 674 (1955);
Adams Act of 1906, ch. 951, Pub. L. No. 5947, 34 Stat. 63, repealed by Act of Aug. 11,
1955, ch. 790, § 2, 69 Stat. 674 (1955); and the Hatch Act of 1887, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 371a-371i (1982)).
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the Impact Aid Program 56 that provided financial aid to local school
districts burdened by the World War II military build-up. No fed-
eral initiative rivaled the educational vision of the Founders5 7 until
the National Science Foundation Act was passed in 1950.58
During the 1950's, government began to devote more attention to
education 59 from two not always complementary perspectives: one
focused on the cost and means of federal involvement in education;
the other on educational quality. While local school districts were
chronically in need of additional funding during this period, they
did not actively seek aid for education at the federal level, in part
because federal aid implied federal control. Proponents of federal
aid to local school districts advocated funding and financing tech-
niques designed to procure federal monies while avoiding direct
federal interference with local educational activity.
60
The funding needs of local school districts became even more
critical in the wake of the Sputnik launching in 1957. While the
Sputnik episode generated massive public concern over the state of
science and math instruction, the National Defense Education Act of
195861 was the principal resulting federal legislation, and it was di-
rected primarily at higher rather than elementary and secondary
schooling. In addition, federal efforts made in response to interna-
tional incidents were oriented towards increasing educational per-
formance in those subject areas likely to be the locus of future
Superpower competition.
Thus, the 1950's yielded little in the way of concrete federal initia-
tives at the elementary and secondary levels. It remained for Presi-
56. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-815, 64 Stat. 967; Act of Sept. 30, 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100.
57. This vision of the nation's founders regarding education is illustrated by their
proposal for a national university. See Washington, Farewell Address, in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 169, 173 (H.S. Commager ed. 1948).
58. The National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81- 507, 64 Stat. 149
(1950), was designed to promote the development of a coherent national policy with
respect to science, to foster research and education in the sciences, to promote the inter-
national exchange of scientific information and to facilitate the federal government's
own scientific inquiries.
59. This increased attention is attributable in part to population increases and to
Cold War propagandizing that led to growing public demand for better education in the
form of more highly qualified teachers and more attention to science and math courses,
for example.
60. One such technique involved requesting federal appropriations for building con-
struction instead of classroom operation. This type of scheme was limited in its useful-
ness, however, to districts that anticipated a pattern of structural expansion over a
period of years, and did not fulfill other funding needs characteristic of the great major-
ity of localities.
61. H.R. 13247, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REc. 19,719 (1958).
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dent Kennedy to launch the first cohesive federal initiative directed
at the earlier, and in many respects more critical, years in the educa-
tional cycle. While the Kennedy initiative ultimately failed, it merits
attention because it provided the foundation for the Johnson Ad-
ministration's more successful efforts.
For elementary and secondary schools, the Kennedy Administra-
tion attempted to secure unrestricted or "general" federal aid from
Congress. Most local school officials had been clamoring for gen-
eral aid because they believed it posed the least threat of direct fed-
eral interference with day-to-day school operations. The general aid
package had to be structured in such a way as to maximize local
budgetary control over federal monies in order to ensure its polit-
ical acceptability. It could take many different forms including, for
example, funds for teacher salary support or building construction.
Elementary and secondary school legislation providing for gen-
eral aid was proposed and reproposed by the Kennedy Administra-
tion.62 These legislative initiatives were repeatedly thwarted by a
combination of forces, the most persistent and seemingly insoluble
of which was the church-state issue. Catholic school supporters op-
posed Protestants over the question whether federal aid to educa-
tion should be distributed to parochial schools. The prominence of
the church-state battle should not overshadow other intransigent
forces, however, the most conspicuous of which was Southern oppo-
sition to federal aid for black schools.63 These socio-political reali-
ties only aggravated Executive efforts to ensure local control of
federal education funds. In the eleventh hour before anticipated
legislative ratification of a general aid bill proposed by the Kennedy
Administration in the spring of 1962, telegrams and letters in oppo-
sition from public schools and religious organizations flooded the
Congress and blocked the bill's passage.
Opposition was not nearly as fierce over federal aid to higher edu-
cation, especially given the link in the national consciousness be-
tween scientific inferiority and international power. A positive
consequence of this Cold War mentality was the successful passage
of additional aid to higher education in 1963.64 The aid demon-
62. S. 1021, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 9054 (1961); H.R. 4970, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 2918 (1961). (These bills were reproposed during the
1st Session of the 88th Congress, S. 580, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG REC. 1273
(1963); H.R. 3000, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 1270 (1963)).
63. At the time, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee Adam
Clayton Powell provided a visible and insistent voice against this Southern opposition.
64. H.R. 6143, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 24,721 (1963).
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strated the Kennedy Administration's commitment to higher educa-
tion, even if at this point the commitment was only a domestic
reflection of Superpower politics. The scope of this aid, however,
was limited. It remained for the Great Society to realize the poten-
tial for enhanced educational opportunity implicit in the Kennedy
Administration's policies.
B. The Great Society's Contribution to Educational Opportunity
By mid-1963, educational planning had been slowed by the failure
of general aid legislation in the Congress. Efforts were renewed,
however, when policy-makers involved in planning the War on Pov-
erty thought that associating the lack of educational opportunities
with the presence of poverty might neutralize the opposition to fed-
eral aid to elementary and secondary education. Other factors con-
tributed to a climate of renewed effort on the education front.
Public pressure for improvements in education and educational op-
portunity was mounting. 65 The atmosphere of international compe-
tition created by the Sputnik incident intensified public awareness of
education's role in America's future, an awareness made all the
more acute by the Government's announcement in 1963 of its
"Moon Shot" objective. Furthermore, a sense of general deficiency
pervaded the post-assassination national mood. Most importantly,
however, an activist Johnson Administration possessed a powerful
vision of a Great Society in which education played a central role.
The time was clearly ripe for broadening and deepening the na-
tional commitment to education. Obstacles, however, remained.
As I have tried to show above,66 local educators were generally
apprehensive about federal influence in local educational activities.
They sought to avoid or prevent federal control whenever possible.
Local educational officials conceived of improvement in educational
quality as a mere function of externalities such as funding and
teacher credentials. They therefore believed that the role of the fed-
eral government in elementary and secondary education should be
limited to providing these externalities.
Another vision of the federal government's role in elementary
and secondary education would strengthen rather than weaken local
communities, however. This vision was predicated on the belief that
federal aid could be structured to improve local educational structures
("internalities" if you will) by creating alternative programs, institu-
65. 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION, 1935-1971 1654-55 (1972).
66. Supra pp. 33, 34.
Yale Law & Policy Review
tions and consortia to focus the local community's efforts on the
nature of and solution to its particular educational needs. Like
Community Action, this structural approach would likely lead to
broader and deeper participation of local people in the affairs of
their communities.
While by 1963 no one had publicly articulated this kind of struc-
tural approach to federal educational policy, the Great Society
pushed the federal government in this very, perhaps even radical,
different direction. A review of the two major planning exercises
which shaped the bulk of the Johnson Administration's educational
programming, the 1964 and 1967 President's Task Forces on Edu-
cation, demonstrates the extent of the Great Society's commitment
to the enhancement of both opportunity and quality in education.
1. The 1964 Task Force
In the late spring of 1964, President Johnson appointed a White
House Task Force on Education. This group deliberated into the
late fall, at which time it issued a report that advocated making the
poor the focus of an aid package for elementary and secondary edu-
cation. Focus on the poor was considered appropriate for a variety
of reasons, not the least of which was the desire to avoid the reli-
gious-Southern coalition that had defeated President Kennedy's
general aid bill.
67
In choosing the Task Force's members, President Johnson sought
to offset political contradictions with intellectual competence,
thereby to recreate on a lesser scale the diversity of opinion which
would greet any proposal for federal legislation. Influential repre-
sentatives of religious organizations, civil rights groups, business in-
terests, the local control-no federal influence constituency, and the
federal control camp comprised the Task Force. In this way Presi-
dent Johnson made certain that the Task Force possessed sufficient
diversity to ensure respect for any consensus it might reach or any
proposal it might make. At the same time, this diversity rendered
problematic reaching a consensus with respect to key issues. That
the Task Force was able to reach a consensus is a testament both to
its abilities and to the pressing nature of the issue with which it was
faced.
John W. Gardner, psychologist and President of the Carnegie
Corporation, chaired the 1964 Task Force. As Task Force Chair,
Gardner attempted to instill in his colleagues the ethos of innova-
tion as the motivating principle for their collective effort. By em-
67. Supra p. 34.
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phasizing innovation, Gardner meant to imply not a technical or
scientific definition of the term, but rather a more enlightened and
socio-culturally based concept.
Two other Task Force members, Edwin Land and Jerrold
Zacharias, were physical scientists; their presence was at least in part
a testament to the prestigious position science had attained since
the National Science Foundation had launched its campaign in the
1950's to promote the "new math" and the "new science." Both
Land and Zacharias were amenable to Gardner's emphasis on inno-
vation in educational planning: Land, the businessman-scientist, was
a gifted inventor; Zacharias was a university scientist intent on im-
plementing innovative curricula in math and science at the elemen-
tary and secondary levels.
Two other members of the Task Force, Ralph Tyler and David
Reisman, were social scientists. Tyler, a specialist in educational re-
search, was cautious and analytic while at the same time committed
to the Gardnerian variety of innovation. Reisman, a leading figure
in the social sciences, was intent upon determining the political lim-
its of the Task Force's proposals. While President Johnson had
charged the Task Force to proceed with unconstrained imagination,
at Reisman's urging, "constrained creativity" became another of the
Task Force's prominent motifs. The other eight Task Force mem-
bers represented the many different constituencies concerned about
educational policy. 68 The Task Force was also assisted and influ-
enced by some people not formally members such as Francis Kep-
pel, former Dean of the Harvard School of Education and then
Commissioner of Education. Various staff members of the Budget
Bureau and other federal agencies also assisted the Task Force in
carrying out its mandate. In addition, the Task Force called upon
people around the country to submit ideas and program proposals
for consideration.
The energy generated by and around the Task Force ultimately
translated into concrete proposals that, were they carried out, would
have involved massive federal intervention into the elementary and
68. State educational interests were represented by James Allen, Jr., one of the few
chief state school officials in the country genuinely concerned about educational quality.
The Reverend Paul C. Reinert, a Roman Catholic priest, represented one side of the
church-state issue. Raymond Tucker was the representative big-city mayor. Stephen
Wright was a university official, and Sidney Marland was a big-city public school superin-
tendent. Hedley Donovan, editor of a national news magazine, represented the civic-
minded yet business-oriented constituency. Harold Gores represented no identifiable
interests but did possess a strong background in educational issues. Clark Kerr, the last
member of the Task Force, was a university president.
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secondary educational systems.6 9 While the idea of federal participa-
tion carried with it certain political liabilities, it also possessed the
potential to impose uniform educational standards, to improve edu-
cational quality nationwide, and most importantly, to improve edu-
cational opportunities for the poor. This latter objective became
the centerpiece of the Task Force's program of innovation.
Before considering substantive solutions, the Task Force had to
outline an approach to the problems it had identified; in particular,
it had to meet the objections likely to be voiced by the opponents of
general federal aid. In its Report, issued November 14, 1964, the
Task Force supported general federal aid as the best means of as-
suring innovation and qualitative improvement in education. The
Task Force recognized, however, that political realities might retard
acceptance of its proposals:
The Task Force favors general Federal aid to the public schools .... It
is not a part of our assignment to weigh questions of political feasibil-
ity. But we believe it is of crucial importance that other forms of aid-
such as the major programs dealt with elsewhere in this report-not be
held up while we go through one more agonizing tug-of-war over the
church-state issues.
70
The Task Force was careful not to exhibit an intransigent attach-
ment to the notion of general federal aid. Had the Task Force ex-
pressed such an unqualified commitment, it would probably have
fanned the fires of the church-state question beyond repair and ren-
dered impotent the Johnson initiative.
Having successfully avoided the general aid pitfall, at least rhetor-
ically, the Task Force Report went on to make a strong case for ori-
enting the federal effort in elementary and secondary education
towards increasing educational opportunities for the poor.7' The
69. The 1964 Task Force afforded less attention and a lower priority to issues of
higher education.
70. J. GARDNER, REPORT 6F THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION 78 (Nov. 14,
1964).
71. Chapter II of the Task Force Report, entitled "Opportunity to Learn," detailed
this rationale for federal aid to elementary and secondary education:
The American school system is designed to provide a common and adequate edu-
cation for millions of children, and it has not done that for children who do not fall
into common categories - at the fortunate end of the spectrum, the exceptionally
talented; at the less fortunate end, the poor child, the physically or mentally handi-
capped, indeed all of those who for various reasons fall behind their peers.
In recent years the nation has begun to provide better opportunities for excep-
tionally talented children. These efforts must not slacken (indeed we must do far
more). But we must now make a comparable effort on behalf of less fortunate
children.
... Theoretically, a child in rags should be as teachable as a child in tweeds. But
most poor children are to be found in our rural and urban slums, and these slums
breed conditions that do in fact diminish the teachability of the child. The child
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Task Force members thought they might thereby achieve a crucial
educational reform while simultaneously neutralizing some of the
more vocal opposition to federal aid. The Task Force call for aid to
poor children was a useful political and moral imperative; the cate-
gory of poverty cut across and embraced most other interest group
identities. Poor children were rural, urban, white, black, Catholic
and Protestant. In addition, it was thought that aid to poor chil-
dren, by setting a significant precedent in terms of a large-scale, cat-
egorical grant program, would facilitate the eventual emergence of
general federal aid to education. Thus, the idea of a poverty-cen-
tered proposal was clearly a compromise measure that fell short of
general aid; at this point, however, it was also an idea with the po-
tential to unite the country, as it had the Task Force, behind the
federal initiative.
And unite the country it did. National compassion for poor chil-
dren both transcended and confounded the opposition to federal
involvement. Lobbyists for religious organizations found the posi-
tion of trading off poor children for their own special interests an
especially difficult one to sustain. Neither Catholics nor Protestants
could protest too loudly. Where Protestants found it difficult to
maintain a strict separation-of-church-and-state stance in the face of
a call for federal aid to increase educational opportunities for the
nation's poor, neither could Roman Catholics espouse an intransi-
gent "us or nothing" attitude. As it turned out, the public was even
willing to risk subsidizing Catholic schools through the aid to poor
school children legislation, insofar as some poor Catholic schools
were likely to be beneficiaries under this part of the legislative
scheme.
The Task Force recommendation for a federal education program
based on aid to poor school children was eventually translated by
the budgetary and legislative process into a large-scale formula
grant program to the states. Under Title I of the Elementary and
finds little in his family or neighborhood environment to encourage intellectual
growth. The schools are very probably inferior in quality, and it is not easy for them
to attract good teachers. Thus in those areas where children need more intensive
educational services than other children, they often get less. For too many of the
poor, educational experience has been a series of failures, each failure reinforcing
the lesson of failure so that education is for them an habituation to despair, to lack
of self-confidence and self-respect, and to a sense of barriers not passed.
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original). This chapter of the 1964 Task Force Report provided
the foundation for what later became Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1965))
[hereinafter cited as ESEA, Title I].
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Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), 72 every school district in
America with a sufficient number of poor children (as defined by the
legislation) was eligible for the federal monies.
73
While the Task Force believed that aid to the poor could provide
an effective way of initiating meaningful federal involvement in ele-
mentary and secondary education, it preferred not to stake its entire
program on a then unproven intuition. Religious and other opposi-
tion forces could still subvert the legislative process by arranging
closet conversations with congressmen, inserting complex qualifica-
tions and reservations into drafts of legislation, and haggling over
program details. The Task Force sought to avoid this kind of indi-
rect obstructionism by proposing an affirmative corollary to the pov-
erty-directed aid in the form of "supplementary education
centers."
74
The Task Force conceived the supplementary centers as institu-
tions that would reinforce and enhance existing educational pro-
grams in elementary and secondary schools around the country.
These centers were intended neither to substitute for ongoing pro-
grams nor to add superfluous programming. Their availability was
not limited to slum schools. Thus, supplementary education centers
could even be employed to help parochial schools remedy their edu-
cational deficiencies in the sciences.
The theory motivating the supplementary centers proposal re-
sembled the philosophy behind the Community Action Program in
that both sought to provide a flexible institutional structure which
72. ESEA, Title I.
73. Because the program's reach was so broad, the legislation required large appro-
priations from the outset to effectuate its goals. Even in the early years of the program,
its cost approached the one billion dollar plus mark. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1814, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 3844, 3844.
Despite the apparent extent of congressional commitment to appropriations for the
program, the federal funds were never either sufficient or sufficiently focused on poor
children to achieve the Task Force objectives. While appropriations under Title I cur-
rently hover at the $3.5 billion level, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, APPENDIX TO BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986 1-1(1), the Task Force estimated that by the mid to late 1970's,
spending under Title I would total $6-10 billion in 1967 dollars.
In addition, the extent to which the funds have benefited poor children directly, as
opposed to local school districts in general, is an open question. The automatic formula
grant program mechanism is at least partly to blame for this ambiguity. The Office of
Education may have also undermined the legislative mandate by promulgating regula-
tions which did not require the states to ensure that poor schoolchildren be the direct
beneficiaries of the aid, even though the Commissioner had the authority to ensure this
result. See, e.g., ESEA, Title I, §§ 201-202.
74. This Task Force proposal subsequently became Title III of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 39 (repealed by 20
U.S.C.§ 841 (1978)) [hereinafter cited as ESEA, Title III].
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would facilitate local organization and action, and to achieve desira-
ble social advances by establishing the infrastructure necessary for
resolving debilitating political contradictions. While the educa-
tional centers were intended only to supplement and not to replace
the existing national school system, they would function as parallel
institutions which, in addition to providing needed services, would
compete with and thereby improve the quality of elementary and
secondary schools. 75 In this way it was hoped that the centers would
both remedy existing deficiencies in elementary and secondary edu-
cation, and unite public opinion in the call for more fundamental
changes in the future.
To implement the supplementary education centers proposal,
both the Task Force Report and the subsequent legislation recom-
mended a project grant approach as opposed to the automatic
formula grant mechanism employed in the aid to poor children pro-
gram.76 Under a project grant regime, the supplementary centers
program would function like a private foundation located within
government, authorized to make large-scale grants to improve the
national educational system.
In the eyes of many interested observers, however, the project
grant approach, by vesting authority in the Office of Education to
determine which school districts would receive funding, was inher-
ently suspect. Such an approach, it was argued, would lead inevita-
bly to that most dreaded result: federal control of elementary and
secondary schools. Moreover, many local school officials saw the
project grant implementation mechanism of the supplementary
center proposal as facilitating general aid. Because aid from the sup-
plementary centers program would not be limited to poor children
or slum schools, large-scale aid was not precluded under the
program.
75. Although the Task Force did not emphasize the relationship between the supple-
mentary centers concept and the idea of a "parallel school system," the latter was surely
an intellectual progenitor of the former. While establishment of a parallel school system
funded by the federal government would have been politically unpalatable, the supple-
mentary centers concept retained certain of the advantages posed by an alternative sys-
tem, while at the same time emphasizing more traditional supplementary functions such
as language or science program enhancement.
76. Formula grants are general eligibility grants for states and localities. For in-
stance, a formula grant for supplementary education centers would have provided fund-
ing based upon the percentage of poor children in a particular school district. Project
grants, on the other hand, require application and explanation for why the money is
needed and to what end. Using project grants to determine funding for supplementary
centers allowed for the selection of the highest quality projects, and thus for choosing
among competing projects.
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Given the broad federal authority incorporated into the supple-
mentary education centers program and the possibility that such au-
thority could translate into direct federal control, it is surprising that
Title III of the ESEA was either enacted or administered. 77 Never-
theless, at the time the Task Force issued its report in the fall of
1964, a number of factors favored the program's acceptance. First,
blanket ideological opposition to federal involvement in elementary
and secondary education had weakened considerably since the days
of the Kennedy Administration's failed initiative. In addition, the
Task Force incorporated the principle of local control into the sup-
plementary education centers proposal in an effort to mitigate antic-
ipated opposition, and Congress followed suit by conditioning
federal funds on the reinforcement and extension of the local con-
trol principle. Furthermore, the program's emphasis on quality ed-
ucation appealed to the Budget Bureau because it carried the
promise of extracting the maximum effect per federal dollar in-
vested, unlike formula grant-based programs.
Most importantly, however, the supplementary education centers
program resolved the political problem of aid to parochial schools.
Legislative articulation of the supplementary centers program pre-
served ownership and control of supplementary facilities and pro-
grams in the local schools while requiring that they share both
resources and programming with other institutions in the commu-
nity, including Community Action agencies, libraries, universities,
museums and private schools. 78 Such a consortium, it was hoped,
would both develop a sense of corporate and cooperative identity
and enhance educational quality and opportunity within the com-
munity. In addition, the establishment of an interdependent com-
munity consortium through the supplementary education centers
would create a satisfactory political (and constitutional) vehicle for
aid to private schools.
After resolving the issues of federal control and parochial partici-
pation, at least at the planning stage, the Task Force still faced the
77. In fact, administration of the supplementary education centers program subse-
quently proved too difficult for the Office of Education which then persuaded Congress
to turn the program over to the individual states. Elementary and Secondary Education
Amendments of 1967, Part C, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783, 788-799 (repealed by 20
U.S.C. § 841 (1978)).
78. The supplementary centers provided an important and effective form of aid to
Roman Catholic children under conditions that most people could accept and even en-
dorse. While the centers, in effect, provided some parochial schoolchildren with a pub-




major issue of federal aid to predominantly black schools. The key
to resolving this problem lay in a two-pronged appeal to Southern
sensibilities: federal aid to elementary and secondary schools would
benefit poor white children as well as poor black children, and it
would help relieve the strain on state taxing and spending pro-
grams. To be sure, the fact that Adam Clayton Powell was the
Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee at the time
helped assure passage of this part of the Task Force's program. Na-
tional public opinion on the poverty issue, mounting concern over
educational opportunity and quality, and the sympathetic presence
of a Southern President were also important in tempering Southern
opposition.
If aid to poor schoolchildren and supplementary education cen-
ters were the principal elements of a program designed to persuade
the President and the Congress to enact educational legislation,
other proposals also figured prominently in the Task Force Report.
Of particular importance were the proposals to establish regional
research and demonstration laboratories, and to subsidize state de-
partments of education and textbook purchases. The research labo-
ratory proposal was designed as a forum for the innovation and
dissemination of advanced educational techniques, and reflected the
Task Force's commitment to its intellectual and academic constitu-
ency. The laboratory idea was a favorite of the Budget Bureau, re-
flecting that agency's persistent advocacy of measures designed to
improve educational quality. The subsidy proposals were intended
as a fairly blatant appeal to school budgeteers, and, in the case of
textbooks, as further financial aid to parochial schools.
The Task Force also contributed somewhat to the federal role in
advancing opportunity in higher education, especially with respect
to financing the college education of low-income students. Because
the focus of the Task Force was on elementary and secondary educa-
tion, however, the primary initiatives in this area derived from other
sources, namely the Budget Bureau's work-study program, the
White House's guaranteed student loan program, and Congress'
low-income student grant program.
There was no political battle in Congress over the legislation
drafted to implement the Task Force's proposals. The Administra-
tion's bill sailed through the Congress relatively unscathed, owing
in part both to the President's insistence and to the legislative
adroitness of Wilbur Cohen and Francis Keppel.7 9 I believe the suc-
79. Commissioner Keppel's legislative strategy was particularly important in antici-
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cess of this legislative initiative can be attributed, more generally, to
the fact that the approach to federal aid to elementary and secon-
dary education derived from the executive branch.
Thus the initial foray of the Great Society into the arena of educa-
tion was an overwhelming success, especially in the crucial and con-
troversial area of elementary and secondary education. Although aid
to the poor was a central objective of the Task Force, victory on this
count was achieved only because aid to poor schoolchildren was
perceived as a means of achieving other, more politically pressing
objectives. In higher education programs as well as in those insti-
tuted at the elementary and secondary levels, the Great Society be-
gan to reveal itself as not only seeking to enhance educational
opportunity, but also to equalize education; that is, to increase the
educational achievement and status of the entire population. The
emphasis on equality of education, or quality education for all, man-
ifested itself in the second major educational initiative of the Great
Society, the President's Task Force on Education appointed in 1966
and reporting on June 30, 1967.
2. The 1967 Task Force
This second Task Force was appointed at a time when the Great
Society, with strong Presidential backing and widespread public ac-
ceptance, seemed capable of further development. This atmos-
phere of optimism, together with the administrative need for
systematic annual planning for renewing and extending the Presi-
dent's legislative program, led to the second convocation of major
policy-making figures and educational experts. 80
pating and deflecting political opposition to the President's education program. Kep-
pel's idea involved incorporating educational aid to the poor within the existing Impact
Aid Program, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, in addition to making it Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The Impact Aid legislation was a residual
of special legislation enacted to mitigate some of the devastating educational effects of
World War II on local communities. During the course of its existence, the Impact Aid
Program had provided significant general aid to public schools in more than 300 Con-
gressional districts. By employing a statutory vehicle which combined the new legisla-
tive device of poverty aid and the old one of Impact Aid, Keppel intended to reinforce
the impression that poverty aid was either a form of, or a forerunner to, the general
federal aid desired by most local educators. Keppel hoped that manipulating political
symbols in this way would positively influence the House, where federal aid to education
would be most in jeopardy.
80. In the interim between the 1964 and the 1967 Task Forces, planning exercises of
a different caliber, aimed at the bureaucracy and the Congress, had been conducted.
Because these efforts were oriented towards managing and extending existing pro-
grams, their goals were more modest and their successes were less notable from the
standpoint of national educational policy. In addition, while there would be other Presi-
dential Task Forces on Education after 1967, the waning fortunes of the Johnson Ad-
ministration rendered these efforts fruitless. See infra p. 51.
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The White House staff, in consultation with inside and outside
advisors, selected the members of this second Task Force in much
the same way it had chosen the 1964 Task Force. Particularly influ-
ential in the selection process were John Gardner, then Secretary of
HEW, and Harold Howe, the new Commissioner of Education who
succeeded Francis Keppel.
Chaired by William K. Friday, President of the University of North
Carolina, the 1967 Task Force8' gave extended attention to the pro-
posals for the education of poor children at the elementary, secon-
dary and post-secondary levels. Where the Gardner Task Force had
opened the door to equality of educational opportunity, the Friday
Task Force moved towards equality in education.82
The Report of the Friday Task Force essentially claimed that
equality of opportunity was a norm without substance unless it was
implemented within a context of equal (here meaning equal quality)
educational institutions and practices.8 3 From there, it required lit-
81. I served as the Executive Secretary of the 1967 Task Force.
82. Moving from an emphasis on equal opportunity to an emphasis on equalization
in education constituted a radical step in the history of American social welfare policy,
and, consequently, attempts to implement this goal were hesitant and partial. See infra
pp. 47-49, 51. Nevertheless, it was an important move both because it revealed an outer
limit of the Great Society, at least during those last troubled years of the Johnson Ad-
ministration, and because it provides a valuable blueprint for future innovation in edu-
cational policy.
83. The Report of the 1967 Task Force stressed the origin and nature of its commit-
ment to equality in education in its first pages:
This report reflects the conviction of this Task Force that major steps should now
be taken to extend the quality of opportunity for learning and to advance the quality
of education at all levels. . . .The Task Force wants all children to have an even
chance for a good education. Right now too many do not. Most of these are poor
children. The richer your family the better education you will get....
If you live in the city, the education offered to you will be of a lower grade than in
many of its suburbs. But, even so, the chances are you will get a better education
than if you live in a rural community. If you live in a Southern rural hamlet, you
have practically no chance to learn what most children learn in other parts of the
country.
It seems to us that where you live or how poor your parents are should not be a
bar to getting a decent education. Therefore, this Task Force stresses "equalization
of opportunity" and "quality." We do not recommend an "equalization" that reduces
everyone to the same level (emphasis in original). Our aim is to raise those below
standard-whoever or wherever they are in this country-up to at least a minimum
standard. For example:
*Poor children, wherever they live and whatever their race or ethnic origin,
should have an opportunity for education at least equal in extent and quality to that
of most nonpoor children.
*City children should have an opportunity for an education equivalent at least to
that given in its better suburbs.
*Southern children should be enabled to do at least as well as those in some other
regions.
*Children from minority groups should receive an education which places them
on a parity with other children in the same school district or governmental
jurisdictions.
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tle effort to conclude that equality of education meant, in addition
to equality of "inputs," equality of "outputs" or equality of re-
suits.8 4 Having thus claimed this new ground for the poor, the Task
Force recommended that the federal government once again make
education of the poor its first priority.8 5 To implement this objec-
tive, the Task Force proposed that the federal government:
1) Double the amount of appropriations under Title I of the
ESEA.8 6 This would have meant an increase to approximately $2.5
billion.
2) Increase Title I expenditures annually so that total program
expenditures would fall between $6 and 10 billion, as measured in
1967 dollars, by the mid-1970's.
3) Provide incentives for mixing low and middle-income chil-
dren in schools, and make Title I funds available to middle and up-
per middle-class school districts on the condition that poor children
be included within their school populations.
4) Conduct a massive "moon shot" effort through better curric-
ula and higher-quality teaching to improve the overall level of in-
struction afforded poor children. The Gardner Task Force's
laboratory of educational innovation concept was thus to be ex-
tended and expanded upon.
8 7
5) Institute a "Metropolitan School" system to develop quality
educational programming which would initially funnel $25 million
to each of fifty large metropolitan areas serving a mixture of race
and income classes. Five major metropolitan areas would also re-
ceive additional funding to experiment with techniques designed to
create and maintain a favorable racial and economic mix in their
schools. Funding for the target metropolitan schools program was
to come from federal and other monies available under urban re-
newal and other programs. 8
Although it is possible to interpret the Friday Task Force propos-
als, especially the "moon shot" and the metropolitan school pro-
grams, as mere extensions of the 1964 Task Force initiatives,
8 9 I
W. FRIDAY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION 1-2 (June 30, 1967)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT] (on file with the
author).
84. The Friday Task Force formulation differed markedly in this respect from that of
the Office of Education's 1966 Report, J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J.
MCPORTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFELD & R. YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU-
NITY (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE COLEMAN REPORT]. See infra pp. 47-49.
85. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 4.
86. ESEA, Title I.
87. See supra p. 43.
88. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 1-46.
89. See supra pp. 36-44.
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believe the Friday Task Force extended those initiatives to the point
where they embodied new ideas about the appropriate role of the
federal government in elementary and secondary education. While
both Task Forces aimed largely at the same objective-providing
the nation's children with 1) an equal opportunity for 2) a high qual-
ity education, the Friday Task Force directed its attention towards
implementing the second and more difficult part of the equation.
Through the metropolitan school program, the Friday Task Force
sought to focus the first Task Force's proposals more specifically by
enhancing the education of poor and poorly educated urban chil-
dren.90 Through the "moon shot" program, it sought to maximize
the impetus behind the regional laboratory and supplementary
center ideas of the Gardner Task Force by implementing these re-
forms on a technical and resource scale comparable to that afforded
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
In addition, both these programs were locally oriented in the
spirit of Community Action. Localism was particularly important to
the conception of the metropolitan school program which provided
strong federal incentives to major cities (as opposed to states) to
build stellar new school systems. The Friday Task Force developed
the Community Action principle even further by enlisting the aid of
locally oriented programs like urban renewal.
Perhaps most important, however, was the Friday Task Force's
willingness to tackle the overwhelming reality of racial and eco-
nomic segregation in elementary and secondary education by means
of the metropolitan school program. The fact that it felt free to
posit such far-reaching objectives which touched the root of ine-
quality in American society marked a significant departure from the
days of the first Task Force when even broad, unfocused aid for
poor schoolchildren was considered politically problematic, espe-
cially in the South. Thus, in retrospect, I think it fair to assert that
the metropolitan school proposal reflects the highest point reached
to date in the history of the federal government's commitment to
equality in education.
a. Obstacles to the 1967 Task Force: The Equality of Educational
Opportunity Report
The notion of equal education for all was not readily accepted.
The government itself had erected a particularly important obstacle
in the form of a study commissioned in 1965 that was later used by
90. Focusing federal funds on specific geographical areas was legally possible under
Title I of the ESEA, but the Office of Education effectively blocked this approach to the
disbursement of funds.
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certain policy-makers to justify refusing to implement programs
which sought to equalize education. The report, Equality of Educa-
tional Opportunity (also known as "The Coleman Report" after Pro-
fessorJames S. Coleman of Harvard),9 t derived from a requirement
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act that a study be made of the availability
of equal educational opportunities for minorities and other
groups. 92 The Office of Education assumed the task of conducting a
study, and toward this end, assembled an analytic research group
headed by Professor Coleman.
This research group undertook a landmark "hard data" scientific
study that employed both survey research and analytic mathematical
techniques. The original purpose of the study called for data collec-
tion with regard to the current availability of educational resources
or "inputs" (i.e. physical facilities and teachers) to disadvantaged
social groups in order to create a factual basis for legislation and
appropriations directed towards equalizing those resources. Disre-
garding this objective, however, the study focused on educational
"outputs." 93
The Office of Education Report is significant in this story of the
Great Society's contribution to educational policy for at least three
reasons. First, it embodied rather directly the ethics, social biases
and intellectual inner-directedness typical of the Office of Educa-
tion. Second, the Report illustrated a glaring weakness of the John-
son Administration: its inability to communicate effectively with the
academic political base. Third, and most importantly, despite the
fact that those involved in compiling the Report had little if any ex-
perience with Title I,9 4 the Coleman Report provided the intellec-
91. See THE COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 84 and accompanying text.
92. The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President
and the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this title, concerning the
lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of
race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels
in the United States....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IV, § 402, 78 Stat. 241, 247 (1964) (omitted as executed
at 42 U.S.C. § 200Oc-I (1982)).
93. Elsewhere Coleman has acknowledged his explicit rejection at the time of input
analysis in favor of output analysis:
The study would have been celebrated for its careful accuracy, its measurement of
inequality, and its irrelevance would have gone unnoticed, as policy-makers busily
worked to eradicate those irrelevant inequalities....
... [B]y selective attention to one of the definitions of equality of opportunity,
that is, equality of inputs [the Report would have failed in] its major impact in shift-
ing policy attention from its traditional focus on comparison of inputs... to a focus
on outputs, and the effectiveness of inputs for bringing about changes in outputs.
Coleman, The Evaluation of Educational Opportunity in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OP-
PoRTUNITY 149-51 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
94. ESEA, Title I.
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tual justification for the Nixon Administration's refusal to
implement the Friday Task Force Report by asserting that equaliza-
tion of inputs of resources and money to improve educational op-
portunity and quality for poor children would not work.
When the Friday Task Force began its work in 1966, its members
were fully aware of the Office of Education Report, and sought to
demonstrate their opinion of it by explicitly rejecting its central
finding.95 The Task Force was convinced, both from principle and
from practice, that the availability of institutional educational re-
sources could make a decisive difference in educating the poor. It
adduced its own evidence to demonstrate that resources were sub-
stantially unequal around the nation.9 6 Moreover, the Task Force
was quite frank in arguing that it would cost more to achieve equal-
ity of opportunity and a quality education for poor children,9 7 a
point which the Coleman Report did not adequately address. 98
I believe it fair to say that the Task Force interpreted the Office of
Education Report as more of a political-tactical threat than as an
intellectual challenge. Because most of the members of the Friday
Task Force were academics themselves, they tended to view the
Coleman Report as just another social science study, perhaps more
interesting but certainly no more valid than most. The Task Force
members felt no need to refute the Coleman Report on its own
terms in the form of a countervailing study because they were confi-
dent, from their own research and experience in the field of educa-
tion, that both the methodology and the conclusions of the Coleman
Report were misguided. They were concerned, however, that it
would be seized upon as definitive scientific "truth" and thus trans-
formed into a potent political weapon. This, in fact, is what
occurred. 99
95. Thus, the Friday Task Force concluded:
... [T]he teachers, the curriculum, the facilities and equipment play a key role. The
Task Force challenges interpretations made by some recent studies that school facil-
ities, curriculum, and teachers, or compensatory education programs have an equiv-
ocal and uncertain effect at best, on school achievement. These interpretations
have been used against programs such as Title I [of the ESEA], which assume that
an increase in educational achievement will result from an increase of inputs of edu-
cational resources. But this Task Force simply does not accept them. They are not
based on any assessment of Title I or large-scale long-term compensation pro-
grams. Judicious or larger inputs are bound to have a major effect on learning. Bet-
ter curricula, by themselves, can have a significant effect.
1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 910.
96. See 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 1-10.
97. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 6-10.
98. Mosteller & Moynihan, supra note 93, at 6-10.
99. See supra p. 48.
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b. Higher Education
Because the 1967 Task Force was more concerned than its 1964
predecessor with higher education, it made a number of significant
recommendations for federal financing of higher education that
were designed to improve the quality of both undergraduate and
graduate level education. Whereas the first Task Force concen-
trated its efforts on improving equality of opportunity in elementary
and secondary education, the second Task Force was explicit about
according a higher priority to higher education in general and to
federal financing of higher education in particular. After much dis-
cussion, the Friday Task Force developed a formula for aid to uni-
versities and colleges that centered on grants for facility
construction, research, graduate education and basic unrestricted
aid.
Perhaps more important than the specifics of the financing
scheme was the Friday Task Force's articulation of an important and
path-breaking education policy objective: "We recommend that the
Federal Government take as a conscious objective assuring that all
qualified graduates-and that over the next five years more than two-
thirds of our high school graduates-receive post-secondary educa-
tion."l°° At this time while approximately one-half of all high school
graduates received a post-secondary education, it was estimated that
perhaps 75 to 80% of all high school graduates could meet general
college entrance requirements. 101 Based on these projections, the
Task Force sought to bring the level of participation in post-secon-
dary education up from one-half to two-thirds after a five-year pe-
riod of intensive programming combining aid and incentives. 10 2
The Task Force sought to implement this proposal by recom-
mending a combination of institutional financing and expansion of
existing student aid programs. More specifically, the Task Force
proposed that the federal government increase the amount of aid
available to students at the graduate level and make accompanying
payments to graduate institutions. Another proposal involved pro-
viding funds and expertise to assist high schools in developing spe-
cial programs such as compensatory education programs to prepare
100. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 8-10 (emphasis added).
101. Office of Education, Staff Paper Estimate (1967) (unpublished document on file
with author).
102. The accuracy of the Friday Task Force projections are borne out by the fact
that, in 1980, approximately 63% of all high school seniors entered post-secondary educa-
tional institutions. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, HIGH SCHOOL AND BE-




low-income students for college. 103
c. The Effects of the Friday Task Force
Most of the proposals of the Friday Task Force never reached fru-
ition. The incorporation of the Task Force's proposals into the
President's program proposals to Congress would have occurred in
connection with the submission of the 1968 budget. When the Task
Force reported in June of 1967, however, the time for proposing
and achieving major changes had passed: the escalation of the Viet-
nam War was heralding the long twilight of the Johnson Administra-
tion. Some of the Task Force's more secondary and less
controversial proposals, such as the expansion of existing student
aid programs, were enacted in part.'0 4 The key Task Force pro-
grams - the "moon shot" and metropolitan school programs, opti-
mum access to and sound financing of higher education - barely
surfaced in post-1967 consideration of educational policy. These
program concepts, while still inchoate, nevertheless remain an im-
portant Great Society legacy which future generations of policy-
makers concerned about educational quality as well as educational
opportunity will undoubtably find relevant.
Although the 1967 Task Force reported in the waning days of the
Johnson Administration, it represented the pinnacle of the aspira-
tions and expectations engendered by the Great Society. The Task
Force's program, dedicated as it was to equalizing education as well as
to enhancing educational opportunity, was self-consciously ambi-
tious and expensive. It laudably sought to better the social and eco-
nomic status of Americans not born to privilege by increasing their
access to quality educational resources, a concern which is today
shared neither by educational policy-makers nor by the national
electorate.
C. Some Reflections on Educational Policy in the Great Society
The educational programming of the Great Society was founded,
at bottom, on a basic belief in the efficacy of educational power in a
democracy. The Jeffersonian formula of equality of educational op-
portunity was essential to this conception of the relationship be-
tween learning and political participation. Perhaps more than other
social welfare programs, the educational vision of the Great Society
was consonant with an ideological and historical heritage that
103. 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 88.
104. Pertinent examples include the creation of the Pell Grant Program and the ex-
tension of the Graduate Student Loan Program.
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posited education as the consummate means of individual
advancement.
Yet much of the form of Great Society educational programming
was directed at providing economic power to the nation's educationally
underprivileged who were also, in large part, the nation's poor.
Programs that enhanced educational opportunity and quality for the
poor, however, also enhanced them for middle-class children, white
children and Catholic children. Thus the educational vision of the
Great Society cannot be faulted for focusing narrowly on a specific
segment of the population; benefits that flowed disproportionately
to the poor not only helped other groups as well, but were also sus-
tainable on the theory' 0 5 that it required more resources to enable
underprivileged persons to participate fully in the economic and
political affairs of American life. The only tragedy of this vision lay
in the ultimate susceptibility of its most important elements to the
winds of political fortune.
III. Opportunity and Equality After the Great Society
It is my firm belief that three distinct societies have existed in
America since the early 1960's. The first, the Great Society, lasted
from about 1962 until about 1970; the second, the Nixon-Carter so-
ciety, occupied the 1970's; and the third, the Reagan society, com-
menced with the 1980 election, has lasted to the present and
possesses an indefinite claim on the future.
The Great Society both adopted and promoted an innovative set
of policies and programs in the social welfare context, as I have at-
tempted to show in my accounts of Community Action and educa-
tional planning. For the first time since the New Deal, the federal
government directly addressed the pervasive problem of poverty in
American society, and the people in power were of largely one mind
in their conviction that the problem was capable of solution. The
architects of the Great Society oriented their quest for solutions
around the principle of localism, a principle which both harkened
back to an earlier era in the American political tradition and beck-
oned forward to a future in which communities would have a real
and powerful voice in those public affairs which affected them most
directly. Localism pervaded Great Society efforts on the poverty
and education fronts, and thus marked a departure from the federal-
105. But see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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izing, centralizing and nationalizing nature of the New Deal
programs.
The succeeding society of Nixon, Ford and Carter was discontinu-
ous with the Great Society. Rather than directly expanding or elimi-
nating the programs of its predecessor society, however, the Nixon-
Carter society either incorporated Great Society programs into in-
different or hostile line agencies or weakened these programs by af-
fording them a low priority in the governmental bureaucracy. A
consummate example of the seemingly innocuous yet wholly
debilitating Nixon-Carter approach to the social welfare legacy of
the Great Society was provided by the incorporation of Community
Action into the Community Services Administration, which trans-
formed the innovative program into a mere service delivery
mechanism. 10 6
The Reagan society, in contrast to the Nixon-Carter society, has
chosen to disavow directly the social welfare policies of the Great
Society. This opposition has manifested itself through frontal at-
tacks on both the theory and practice of Great Society programs,
through hostile ideological tracts, and through manipulations of the
budget process to reduce severely the amount of funds available for
line agency operations. Thus, for the present society there is no
poverty problem at all: the poor are poor of their own free will, mar-
ket forces should substitute for government in the arena of social
welfare, and the individual rather than the community should be the
focus of any analysis of the feasibility or desirability of social welfare
programs. Whether these intellectual apologetics for laissez-faire
capitalism will continue to their logical conclusion, namely the ac-
tual relinquishment of federal power in the social welfare context,
remains to be seen.
Much proof exists in the aggregate social indicators of the last two
decades that legitimates my tripartite analysis. These indicators
demonstrate both the passivity of the Nixon-Carter society and the
outright hostility of the present society to the advances made by the
Great Society. To illustrate this movement away from Great Society
objectives and programs, I will focus on data relevant to measuring
poverty, and opportunity and quality in education. 0 7 Examination
of these aggregate statistics indicate that not only have the Great
Society's Community Action and education programs been termi-
106. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
107. Other areas where statistics bear out the successor societies' turning away from
the Great Society include civil rights, housing, and health care (particularly the slowing
decline in infant mortality rates).
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nated, but that its commitment to finding a solution to the poverty
problem and to mitigating the effects of the unequal distribution of
educational opportunities and resources has likewise been
abandoned.
A. The War on Poverty
TABLE 1
1960 1966 1970 1976 1980 1984
Poverty Population 39.9 28.5 25.4 25.0 29.3 33.7
in Millions




Great Society planners employed programs such as Community
Action to combat the problem of poverty, and hoped that such pro-
grams would eliminate poverty as a pervasive social problem in
American society. The above figures demonstrate, however, that in
the Nixon-Carter era, the numbers of people classified as poor be-
gan to rise. The government of the present society is presiding over
an even more rapid increase in the poverty levels: while the figure
for the poverty population as a percent of the total population fell
9.6% from 1960 to 1970, it rose 0.4% from 1970 to 1980, and has
risen an additional 1.5% in only the first four years of the 1980's.
These figures could reflect a waning government commitment to
solving the poverty problem during the Nixon-Carter era and direct
renouncement of the same during the Reagan era. While the Great
Society successfully lessened the burden of poverty through Com-
munity Action and other War on Poverty programs, the present so-
ciety's increasing poverty rolls point not to a lack of means for
solving the problem, but rather to a political stance opposed to
solutions.
As noted above, this shift in political priorities translated directly
into indifferent and antagonistic responses on the part of successor
societies towards Great Society programs. Besides overseeing the
transformation of Community Action into a mere service delivery
system, the Nixon-Carter society relocated the Office of Economic
Opportunity outside the Executive Branch and instigated the ab-
108. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 454 (1985) (table no. 758, listing number and percentage of persons




sorption of other Great Society social welfare programs by the line
agencies where they were stripped of their innovative elements.
Indeed, the Reagan era assault on the theory and practice of the
Great Society was clearly facilitated by the subterranean nature of
the Nixon-Carter transformation. The Nixon-Carter transformation
effectively prevented the Great Society programs from becoming an
established part of the identity of American government in the
twentieth century, a role the Great Society planners had envisioned
for their brand of enlightened localism. As a consequence, the Rea-
gan society, eager as an ideological matter to end government's in-
volvement in social welfare programs, has been able to employ
deficit fears and an emphasis on defense spending to force deep cuts
in agency budgets. Because the programs of the Great Society were
prevented from establishing themselves as integrated parts of in-
dependent local entities as originally conceived, and were trans-
formed instead into mere line items in agency budgets, the Reagan
society's troublesome trade-off went unopposed by any politically




1900 1966 1970 1980 1982
Average Expenditure 1512 1928 2380 3020 2900
Per Pupil in Constant
Dollars, 1982109
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1960 1970 1980 1983





While the Great Society placed a primary emphasis on improving
education, the above figures show that the successor societies clearly
abandoned that goal. Average expenditures per pupil in public and
109. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL
STATISTICS 84 (1984).
110. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT at 129 (table no. 205, listing school expenditures by
source of funds, 1960-1983).
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private schools nationwide rose 57% during the 1960's, only 27%
during the 1970's, and fell 4% from 1980 to 1982. Similarly, and
even more dramatically, federal disbursements to public and private
schools as a percent of total elementary and secondary school ex-
penditures rose 90% during the 1960's, only 18% during the
1970's, andfell 23% in the period from 1980-1983. As with the ag-
gregate poverty data, the severe leveling off of expenditures during
the Nixon-Carter period reflects that society's general indifference
and even mild hostility towards federal spending for education.
Likewise, the precipitous decline in spending during the Reagan era
is evidence of that society's open aversion to such spending, particu-
larly when the primary target of federal aid to education is poor
schoolchildren, who, it is argued, should be able to pull themselves
up by their own bootstraps and repair any inequality of inputs
through their own resourcefulness.
This lack of commitment towards improving education, and espe-
cially towards improving education for the poor, has characterized
the administration of Great Society education programs in the
1970's and 1980's. Political and administrative constraints required
the Great Society planners to cede their new education programs to
an old line agency, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare. While the planners were in power, they were able to resist the
natural tendency of the bureaucracy to convert the education pro-
grams into simple general aid packages. In the Nixon-Carter soci-
ety, however, the bureaucracy reasserted itself and began
converting the programs into general aid programs. With the open-
ing of the Reagan era, even these general aid to education pro-
grams, like the poverty programs, were caught in the squeeze
between military spending and budget cutting, with the result that
total spending for educational programming experienced a marked
decline.
IV. Looking Ahead at Policy
By analyzing the successor societies' treatment of the Great Soci-
ety initiatives in poverty and education, I have attempted to show
the impossibility of extending into the future either the policies or
the forms of the Great Society in a direct or continuous way. This
impossibility derives at least in part from the fact that the successor
societies have effectively dismantled the ideological and structural
foundations on which the Great Society was erected. Poverty, the
political emargination of the poor, inequality of educational oppor-
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tunity, and the unequal distribution of educational resources still
pervade the American experience. Instead of trying to recreate so-
cial welfare policy in the image of the Great Society, however,
would-be policy-makers must invent new ways of approaching these
old problems.
Because the assumptions that characterized the Great Society's
perspective on American polity and society have been subordinated
to the normative agenda of the successor societies, any effort to res-
urrect successfully a dignified and feasible poverty policy must take
this change of world-view into account. For example, I believe an
effective poverty policy could be organized on the assumption that,
unlike during the period of the Great Society, politics is now class-
based, and consequently, poverty is now a class issue rather than
simply an income or economic issue." l ' Were this line of policy de-
velopment pursued, the conception and implementation of social
welfare programs would rest on an analysis of their implications for
either maintaining or dismantling the class structure of American
society.
In the 1980's, raising public consciousness about poverty in
America to the level of concern, and beyond concern, to the level of
action, will be no easy task. As I see it, at least three approaches to
this problem of public concern and the concomitant problem of
political feasibility are possible, two of which involve direct appeals
to the existence of a class structure in a nation whose political my-
thology obscures that structure through the twin ideologies of
classlessness and social mobility. First, public consciousness might
be raised by an effective appeal to collective social responsibility; a
forceful argument might be made that a commitment to human dig-
nity and decency demands a comprehensive effort to eliminate pov-
erty in our society. A second tactic involves the claim that the
existence of a substantial and dependent underclass threatens na-
tional economic aspirations of growth and prosperity. Third is the
argument that the presence of the poor undermines faith in a polit-
ical ideology of classlessness. This last argument demands either
that we revise our political ideology or eliminate the underclass.
111. An alternative, and perhaps socially more enlightened, approach to a new pov-
erty policy might be predicated upon a commitment to equality as opposed to an under-
standing of class. I do not emphasize this approach here for the simple reason that a
poverty policy predicated upon equality must value equality of ends as well as means in
order to be effective. The inconsistency with the American political tradition of a con-
ception of equality that values position over opportunity is patent, and in this era, con-
clusive, with regard to its politicial viability.
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The obvious difficulty with the collective social responsibility ap-
proach is that it relies on the ability of existing political processes to
foster a sense of responsibility for poor people in an era when the
middle classes perceive themselves as the principal victims of the
economic downturn of the last decade. The strength of the second
and third approaches lies in the implicit and explicit hypocrisy of
adhering to a political mythology of equal opportunity in a society
where the underclass is large and growing, and is largely perma-
nent. For the vast majority of poor people in America today there is
no exit from poverty, either for themselves or for their children, and
they are beginning to recognize the permanent nature of this status.
For these people, the American myths of social mobility and eco-
nomic opportunity are wearing thin.
Perhaps because the gap between the ideal and the real in Ameri-
can political mythology has widened to the point where the legiti-
macy of the ideal is seriously threatened, it might be possible to
galvanize public support for a new poverty offensive around the
threat such a gap poses to time-honored beliefs. In this way it might
be possible to avoid posing the issue as one which demands that the
middle classes give up something tangible and material to preserve
the lives of poor people, and which instead ties the fate and well-
being of the middle classes to the fate and well-being of the poor.
For the middle classes, such an approach can bring ideological sal-
vation; for the poor, perhaps a way out of poverty.
An approach to poverty policy through an understanding of class
would be neither easy to achieve nor to implement, given both the
resistance to such a conception inherent in the political ideology it-
self and the potential such a conception possesses for radical social
change. Nevertheless, such an approach has much to offer the poor
in terms of an escape from outmoded and obsolete social appeals.
Arguing for the poor from the perspective of class would allow pol-
icy-makers to portray the problem of poverty as a structural rather
than as a behavioral issue. In this way, economic policies formu-
lated to alleviate poverty might be "marketed" in the political arena
as a means of eliminating a dead weight on the national economic
system. Such an approach has the added virtue of appealing to a
broad spectrum of political interests: liberal, left, and conservative
alike. Exactly what these economic policies might be I do not know,
except that I am convinced that simple job training would not be a
sufficient response to poverty in the context of a class analysis.
Other possible economic programs formulated in response to view-
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ing poverty as a class phenomenon might include restructuring the
current scheme for distributing family allowance payments, and in-
creasing dependent tax exemptions for the poor and the nonpoor
alike with an eye towards rearranging the economic power configur-
ation within the underclass family.
Viewing poverty as a structural phenomenon will also likely lead
policy-makers back to the formative institution of education, and
lead them to investigate more closely the ways in which inequalities
are created and maintained by the existing educational system, with
its three-track structure of academic, general and vocational pro-
grams. While I think that developmental approaches to education at
the elementary levels should be emphasized, I remain convinced
that more critical attention should be paid to secondary education in
general and high school education in particular as breeding grounds
of inequalities. More specifically, policy-makers need to examine
the vocational training and general education programs in American
high schools - areas to which none of the recent education com-
missions have paid much attention. I suspect that a strong correla-
tion exists between the inadequacy of financial and educational
resources devoted to general and vocational education programs (as
compared with that devoted to academic programs), and the low
level of job skills attained by the vast majority of workers from the
underclass. While part of the problem results from the quantitative
fact that not enough vocational education exists to serve the rele-
vant constituency of high school students, another part surely in-
volves the failure of educational pedagogy and theory to take
vocational education seriously as an intellectual matter. Because ed-
ucation is so vital to the perpetuation of a democracy, I believe that
informed reorganization of the educational system in America could
radically transform and empower the underclass.
In addition, I remain convinced that the underclass is socially and
politically educable and that the key to tapping this vast reserve of
human resources lies in action at the community level. Government
must facilitate the self-education of the poor and the disempowered,
and it must begin this task with as great a concern for how the un-
derclass perceives itself as with how the nonpoor majority perceives
the underclass. While a concerted effort to eradicate poverty in
America must direct itself to many fronts at once, including housing,
health and education, policy-makers should not neglect the impor-
tance of cultural elements in the poverty equation. While efforts to
foster a greater sense of dignity and self-worth among the under-
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class might go far towards engendering in the poor that conscious-
ness of the public good necessary for effective participation in the
public arena, such an approach may have the added benefit of mak-
ing traditional social welfare programs more effective and perhaps
even superfluous. A class-based approach to the poverty problem in
America thus has the potential to move us beyond the current dep-
recatory view of the underclass to a conception of the poor that em-
phasizes its heretofore untapped and underutilized potential.
Facing the policy-makers of this era is the challenge of developing
social welfare programs as appropriate for the times as were those
of the Great Society. While the social welfare programs of the Great
Society were predicated on a vision of American society which saw
poverty as a temporary and transitional phenomenon, that vision
must be replaced by one that acknowledges the current permanence
of the underclass, and that recognizes the underclass to be a class
and membership in the underclass to be a status. I believe that pol-
icy-makers can take this discouraging social reality and build new
programs and formulate new policies in an effort to transform this
reality into a different and more enlightened one. Instead of striv-
ing to recreate America of the 1980's in the image of the Great Soci-
ety, however, planners must examine the intellectual and political
history of the Great Society so as to inform their policy decisions.
The faith in an affirmative role for localism which characterized
Great Society initiatives in both poverty and education policy re-
mains a valuable approach to the conception and implementation of
social welfare programs. As a tool of social welfare planning, local-
ism both reflects an important myth in the American political tradi-
tion and provides the only feasible avenue of empowerment for the
poor. A debate may soon begin over the next wave of policy-making
devoted to the eradication of poverty in America. I believe that the
Great Society's commitment to an enlightened localism provides an
important point of departure for that debate.
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